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Abstract
During the medieval and early modern periods the Middle East lost its economic
advantage relative to the West. Recent explanations of this historical phenomenon—
called the Long Divergence—focus on these regions’ distinct political economy choices
regarding religious legitimacy and limited governance. We study these features in a
political economy model of the interactions between rulers, secular and clerical elites,
and civil society. The model induces a joint evolution of culture and political institutions (delegation of power from rulers to elites) converging to one of two distinct
stationary states: a religious and a secular regime. We then map qualitatively parameters and initial conditions characterizing the West and the Middle East (separation
between state and religion, initial political power of clerical elites, and predominance
of religious values in the population) into the implied model dynamics to show that
they are consistent with the Long Divergence as well as with several key stylized
political and economic facts highlighted in the historical narrative. Most notably,
this mapping suggests non-monotonic political economy strategies in both regions, in
terms of legitimacy and limited governance, which indeed characterize their history.
This draft: August 2022; First draft: February 2018
JEL Classification Numbers: O10, P16, P48, N34, N35, Z12, O33.
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Introduction

Around the year 1000 C.E., the Muslim Middle East was far ahead of Christian Western
Europe in terms of socio-economic development. By the dawn of the industrial period (circa
1750), however, the Middle East severely lagged behind along several dimensions, including
technology, innovation, literacy, wages, and financial development (Bosker, Buringh and
Van Zanden 2013, Kuran 2011, Mokyr 1990, Özmucur and Pamuk 2002, Rubin 2017).
Although there is much disagreement as to exactly when this reversal of fortunes occurred,
the literature broadly agrees that in the course of the medieval and early modern periods,
economic institutions in the Middle East failed to keep pace with those of the West. This
is what Timur Kuran (2011) calls the Long Divergence. Urban population is one metric
illustrating the socio-economic divergence, as seen in Figure 1.1
Figure 1: Urban Population in the Islamic World and Western Europe, 800–1800

Data source: Bosker, Buringh and Van Zanden (2013).
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We employ urban population data merely to motivate the idea that a reversal of fortunes occurred. The
timing of the reversal cannot be inferred from this figure for two reasons. First, pre-modern population
data are subject to significant measurement error, perhaps mis-dating the precise point of reversal by
centuries. Second, urban population is just one of many metrics social scientists employ as an indicator
of socio-economic development. Levels of trade, science, technology, and architecture almost certainly
diverged at different times.
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Several important factors have been shown to contribute the Long Divergence. Kuran
(2011) identifies the root cause of Middle East stagnation in the religious legal system (Islamic law or Sharia) in governing most economic activities. Certain aspects of Islamic law,
such as its inheritance system and partnership law, placed impediments that were difficult
for economic actors to overcome, especially as the world changed and opportunities for
long-distance exchange flourished. Well into the 19th century, the Ottoman “institutional
complex” discouraged demand for institutional, legal, and economic change, even as outside economic conditions changed dramatically. Rubin (2017) argues that the persistence
of Islamic law is at least partly a consequence of the role of the political power ceded to
Muslim religious authorities due to their ability to provide legitimacy to the ruler; that is,
to support a belief system whereby citizens have a moral obligation to obey the ruler. This
power was used to block important socio-economic advancements, a leading example being
the printing press, and more generally to limit the political role of elites advocating for
laws and policies more favorable to economic development. In Europe, on the other hand,
where the Catholic Church had a much weaker legitimating role, novel ideas and reforms
spread more quickly (thanks also to the printing press), economic elites in parliaments
developed laws and policies that favored economic development, and long-run economic
growth resulted. Blaydes and Chaney (2013) concentrate on the different constraints faced
by rulers in the Muslim world and Western Europe. In particular, they argue that the
relative weakness of Western European rulers, who had to rely on feudal institutions for
tax collection and military recruitment, led to a balance of power more favorable to local
(feudal) elites, which promoted economic growth in the long run. Muslim sultans, on the
other hand, were not constrained by secular elites in large part due to their access to slave
soldiers, who satisfied both fiscal and military needs. This limited the political power of
economic elites and furthered the socio-economic power of religious elites.
All the common and interdependent themes underlying these narratives fundamentally
(and rather consistently) interpret economic growth in Western Europe and the Middle
East as the outcome of the development of institutional and technological progress brought
about or hindered by different strategies rulers adopted to sustain their political support
and to enlarge fiscal capacity. Motivated by these historical narratives, in this paper we
propose a political economy model of the interactions between rulers, secular and clerical
elites, and civil society. This model provides a unitary account of multiple stylized facts
associated with the Long Divergence between Western Europe and the Middle East in the
period from approximately 476–1517 C.E. In doing so, the model elucidates the historical
2

mechanisms which might have contributed to the divergent growth paths of Western Europe
and the Middle East since the late medieval period. Most importantly, the model provides
novel additional insights into these mechanisms which can be qualitatively mapped into
relevant historical facts and narratives on the subject.
Our political economy model focuses on the distribution of power between rulers and
religious and secular elites. Religious elites provide legitimacy to rulers in return for power
and religious infrastructures.2 Secular elites instead provide tax revenue to the rulers
as a component of a commitment mechanism which constrains the ruler from extracting
resources ex post.3
More specifically, our model captures three fundamental elements of the socio-economic
environment under study. The first concerns the role of religious legitimacy in the institutional set-up. Religious elites provide services to the religious component of civil society
which have the power of shaping its moral beliefs. In particular, religious authorities can
leverage this power to legitimate rule, promoting a package of beliefs which includes a
moral obligation to obey the ruler and, for instance, to accept the imposition of severe
taxation.
The second element is a trade-off between religious legitimacy and religious proscriptions. The power of religious elites requires religious proscriptions (e.g., usury laws) to be
exercised. These proscriptions often end up dampening economic activity. In the spirit of
Kuran (2011), we envision the dominance of Islamic law in business affairs as a ubiquitous
proscription with far-reaching, path dependent economic consequences.
The third element concerns the role of secular elites and limited governance in enhancing the state’s fiscal capacity. Limited governance is the result of the delegation of political
power from rulers to secular elites, who hold the power of the purse by enforcing tax com2

The study of political legitimacy has a long history in the social sciences. Perhaps most famously, Weber
(1947) defined political legitimacy as either charismatic, traditional, or legal-rational. Our definition follows
more closely in the footsteps of the definition of political legitimacy employed by Lipset (1959, p. 86): “the
capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the
most appropriate or proper ones for the society.” For similar definitions of political legitimacy, see Hurd
(1999), Tyler (2006), Gilley (2006), Levi, Sacks and Tyler (2009), Greif and Tadelis (2010), Rubin (2017),
and Greif and Rubin (2022, 2023). More specifically, in our context, see also Auriol and Platteau (2017),
Coşgel, Miceli and Rubin (2012), Coşgel and Miceli (2009), Lewis (1974, 2002), Platteau (2017), Rubin
(2011), and Kuru (2019). In our context, legitimacy takes the form of a religious justification, provided by
religious elites, supporting the ruler’s right to rule and have her demands obeyed (Greif and Rubin 2023).
3
See, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005a) and Bisin and Verdier (2017) for an abstract
class of models where institutional change is driven in large part from the lack of commitment of political
authorities. With respect to these references, in this paper we precisely model the specific institutional
mechanisms dealing with lack of commitment; that is, notably, religious legitimacy and limited governance.
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pliance and sharing the proceeds of fiscal collection with the ruler.4 In these institutional
settings, political power is diffused to many parties, none of whom can act unilaterally.
Limited governance increases tax revenues by placing constraints on the ruler’s ability to
extract resources in societies where the ruler lacks commitment.5
At the heart of our set-up are two central elements: the proportion of religious agents
in the society and the fact that they see a given level of extraction on their resources as
more legitimate than the non-religious portion of the population. In this context, there is
a complementarity between religious legitimacy and the profile of religious values in the
population, which fundamentally affects the socio-economic dynamics of society. An institutional set-up where substantial power is delegated to the clerics in fact reinforces the
incentives of religious individuals to transmit their values across generations,6 increasing
their relative share in the population; and a higher fraction of religious individuals in the
population in turn augments the political incentives for the ruler to delegate power to
clerics to increase legitimacy. This complementarity implies a fundamental role of religious
identity as a somewhat missing component in the historical narratives of the Long Divergence. Indeed, the profile of religious values in civil society is bound to crucially affect the
choices of rulers, e.g., to seek religious legitimacy from the clerics or else to seek political
decentralization to secular elites.
Our model provides numerous insights into the dynamic relations between rulers and
(religious and secular) elites. First, the complementarity between the cultural and institutional dynamics is such that the incentives of rulers to delegate power and acquire religious
legitimacy may become reinforced over time, giving rise to a lock-in effect in spite of religious proscriptions damaging economic activity, as religious cultural values reinforce the
political power of religious elites, and vice versa. This induces joint dynamics of religious
beliefs and institutions which display two types of stationary states: i) a religious regime
where clerics have substantial political power, they legitimate the ruler, and religious cultural values are predominant in the population; and ii) a secular regime where clerics have
4

This notion of limited governance is akin to “inclusive political institutions” (Acemoglu and Robinson
2012) or a broad-based ruling coalition (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009). Limited governance is distinct
from fiscal decentralization (Dincecco 2009, Gennaioli and Voth 2015, Gennaioli and Rainer 2007). Fiscal
decentralization is typically associated with lower tax revenue. Dincecco (2015) calls states that had both
fiscal centralization and limited governance “effective states.”
5
For more on the connection between fiscal capacity and executive constraint, see Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012, 2019), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005b), Besley and Persson (2009, 2010), Bisin and Verdier
(2017), Dincecco (2009), Johnson and Koyama (2017), Mann (1986), North and Weingast (1989), Tilly
(1990).
6
See Bisin and Verdier (2001, 2009, 2011) for economic models of cultural transmission.
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little political power and secular beliefs are predominant. Second, allowing for limited
governance induces a further characterization of the secular regime which tends to display
delegation of political power in favor of the secular elites. Third, the dynamics converge to
either the religious and the secular stationary states depending on the structural parameters of the socio-economic environment (e.g., the legitimating ability of religious elites)
and the initial conditions (e.g., the initial share of religious individuals in civil society).
Importantly, these dynamics are not necessarily monotonic. In a subset of the basin of
attraction of the religious state, for instance, and specifically when religious values are not
predominant initially, rulers will not search for legitimacy from religious authorities for
some time, only to change strategy after religious values are spread enough in the population. Conversely, non-monotonic dynamics in which rulers delegate power to clerical
elites for some time before turning to delegate power to secular elites, occur in the basin of
attraction of the secular stationary state when religious values are initially predominant.
In both cases, the dynamics are characterized and determined by a “horse race” between
cultural and institutional change.
We take the model to historical narratives regarding to the socio-economic environment
of Western Europe and the Middle East in the early Middle Ages with the objective of
providing a qualitative mapping between these narratives and the structural parameters
and initial conditions determining the different dynamics identified by the model. To this
end we focus on the period starting from the end of the Western Roman Empire in the
West and the emerging of Umayyad Caliphate in the Middle East until the onset of the
Reformation in Europe and the capture of the Egyptian Mamluk Empire by the Ottoman
Empire.7 Starting our analysis of the historical narratives from the end of the Roman Empire in the West and the Umayyad caliphate in the Middle East is appropriate because both
events represent initial conditions far from either a secular or a religious stationary state.
Indeed, directly after the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe was highly Christianized but
increasingly under the political rule of non-Christian Germanic kingdoms.8 On the other
hand, the rapid spread of Islam under Muhammad and the first four Muslim Caliphs (622–
661CE) left the newly formed ”Islamic world,” which spanned from the Iberian Peninsula
7

Precise dates are somewhat arbitrary, but we can refer to the period 476–1517. Indeed, 476 CE is the date
commonly associated with the end of the Western Roman Empire, when the Emperor Romulus Augustulus
was forced to abdicate; 661 CE is the year the Umayyad Caliphate emerged; 1517 CE is the year of the
publication of the Ninety-five Theses by Martin Luther as well as the year the Ottoman Empire conquered
the Egyptian Mamluk Empire, giving the former purview over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
8
The study of the many phenomena responsible for the fall of the Roman Empire, including Christianity
(Gibbon 1776) and climate (Harper 2017), is outside the scope of our analysis.
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to South Asia, in a somewhat opposite state: Muslim political rule (legitimated by religious authorities who provided local law and order) dominated a civil society which had
largely not converted to Islam, at least at the beginning of the period in question. As for
the ending points of our analysis, it is natural to take the Reformation in Europe and the
Ottoman rule in the Middle East in that they represent, respectively, the death knell to
the power of the Catholic Church to legitimate rule in Europe,9 and the entrenchment of
religious legitimacy in the Sultanate. In short, by this time, the institutional and cultural
trajectories of the two regions so strongly reinforce each other that the secular state in the
West and the religious state in the Middle East, as characterized by our model, had clearly
emerged.
Specifically, we obtain several stylized facts from the historical narratives regarding
this period which are fruitful to map into our model. First, after the fall of the Roman
Empire, Christianity was relatively weak at legitimating rule (Feldman 1997, Rubin 2011,
2017). The opposite was true for Islam in the Middle East. This was due to the contexts in
which these religions were born. Christianity was born in the Roman Empire, its followers
being a persecuted minority, and hence was in no position to legitimate the emperor.
Early Christian doctrine is clearly reflective of the low legitimating capacity of Christianity
(Feldman 1997, Rubin 2011). Meanwhile, Islam formed conterminously with an expanding
empire, and numerous important Islamic dictates specify the righteousness of following
leaders who act in accordance with Islam (Hallaq 2005, Rubin 2011, 2017).
Secondly, with respect to initial religious cultural values, Christianity was widespread in
the former Roman lands (i.e., religious cultural beliefs were widespread), while this was not
the case for Islam in the Middle East, at least at the beginning of the period under consideration. Islamic political power spread rapidly—spanning the Iberian Peninsula to South
Asia within a century of Muhammad—but the population living under Islamic regimes
were largely non-Muslim for the first few Islamic centuries (Bessard 2020, Saleh 2018).
This tension between the structural ability of religious elites to provide legitimacy and
the initial fraction of the population with religious beliefs—for both the Middle East and
the West— suggests a mapping into the non-monotonic convergence dynamics the model
allows for: the incentives to seek religious legitimacy were initially high in the Christian
West, to be then overtaken because of the limited legitimating ability of Christianity; while
the opposite was the case in the Islamic Middle East.
9

For much more on the rapidly growing literature on the causes and consequences of the Protestant Reformation, see Becker, Pfaff and Rubin (2016) and Becker, Rubin and Woessmann (2021).
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While the map we obtain between parameters and initial conditions into different dynamics for the West and the Middle East is purely qualitative, we show that it is indeed
consistent with several fundamental aspects of the historical narrative. First of all, the
different stationary states attracting the Middle East and the West are representative of
the Long Divergence. The Middle East, in a religious stationary state, is expected to be
less economically vibrant in the long-run, due to the effects of religious proscriptions on
socio-economic activity. Such proscriptions may be narrowly targeted, as in the case of
usury laws or printing restrictions (Coşgel, Miceli and Rubin 2012, Rubin 2011), or they
can affect entire sectors of the economy, as was the case when most commercial transactions
were subject to religious law (Kuran 2005, 2011).10 Furthermore, the main mechanisms
driving the convergence to the distinct stationary states are i) the persistent use of religious legitimacy in the Middle East but not in Western Europe (Kuru 2019, Platteau 2017,
Rubin 2011, 2017); and ii) the lack of limited governance in the Middle East relative to
the West (Blaydes and Chaney 2013).11
Finally, the non-monotonicity of the dynamic paths implied by our mapping is consistent with the historical political economy patterns in the two regions. While we will
discuss this in much more detail in Section 4.3, we note here that in Western Europe,
following the fall of the Roman Empire, rulers of the Germanic “follower kingdoms,” either
converted to Christianity or promoted it, as for instance was the case of the Frankish king
Clovis (r. 481–509) (Tierney 1970, Rubin 2017, pp. 62–63). These strategies characterized
Western Europe until the 11th century, when the re-birth of commerce gave rise to independent cities and increased tensions between the religious and secular elite (Angelucci,
Meraglia and Voigtländer 2021, Rubin 2011). In the Middle East, early Islamic rulers established law and order, administered the state, and encouraged loyalty to the empire by
sending “proto-kadis” (religious judges) to the provinces (Crone and Hinds 1986, Hallaq
2005). After the religious establishment consolidated in the ninth century (Coşgel, Miceli
10

Importantly, as Kuran (2011) points out, such proscriptions can also be path-dependent, preventing future
advancements from taking place and reinforcing institutional lock-in. See also Berman (2000), Carvalho
(2013), Seror (2018). Kuran (2011) argues that religious proscriptions were self-reinforcing because they
stifled demand for institutional and economic change, which meant that little change was supplied. This
argument complements ours, as we focus on the supply-side of institutional change. It also should be
noted that religious proscriptions can have welfare-enhancing features, especially in the case of religious
minorities; see Iannaccone (1992).
11
Relatedly (and complementarily), Platteau (2017) and Auriol and Platteau (2017) argue that reforms
portending long-run economic growth in the West might have been easier to pursue than in the Middle
East thanks to the centralized nature of Christianity. A decentralized body of clerics, as in the case of
Islam, makes autocratic regimes more unstable with respect to economic reforms.
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and Ahmed 2009), and especially after the rise of the madrasa system in the 11th century
(Kuru 2019), religious authorities were the primary agents capable of determining whether
rulers acted in accordance with Islam.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the basic socio-economic environment we study in the paper, in terms of preferences and technologies of the ruler,
the clerics, and the civil society; as well as the space of policy interventions available in
society. In Section 3 we study the societal equilibrium for each generation t (Section 3.1)
and the processes of institutional and cultural change across generations (Sections 3.2 and
3.3, respectively). In Section 4 we map the model into historical facts and narratives.
In Section 5 we extend the model to study equilibrium and dynamics when we allow for
political decentralization to secular elites. In Section 6 we conclude.12

2

Ruler, Clerics, and Civil Society

We consider a political economy model of the distribution of power between three types of
agents: a ruler, religious clerics, and civil society.13 Religious legitimacy, in the model, is
an equilibrium phenomenon. It results from an institutional process of delegation of power
and it depends on the profile of religious values of the civil society in the population, on
the efficiency of the clerics’ “legitimating technology”, and on the degree of restrictiveness
of religious proscriptions imposed by clerics.
Let t = 0, 1, . . . index generations. All agents only live for one generation. As a
consequence, the game played between the ruler, clerics, and civil society is a series of
one-shot games in which behavior is not forward looking with respect to institutional or
cultural evolution.14
12

In the Appendix, we further extend the model to consider the role of religion and religious legitimacy in
inhibiting innovation and technological change (Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni 2015, 2020, Coşgel, Miceli
and Rubin 2012, Davids 2013, Mokyr 1990, 2010, 2016, Squicciarini 2020, White 1972, 1978). More
generally, it is certainly not the case that religion as a whole has always a negative impact on economic
development; see Barro and McCleary (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2019) for an overview of the
literature and a theory of the positive associations between religion and economic development.
13
In Section 5 we shall extend the model to study the relationship, at equilibrium, between religious legitimacy and political decentralization.
14
This is in line with the conceptualization of institutional change proposed in Greif and Laitin (2004) and
Greif (2006), in which institutions are exogenous to the players at any given point in time but evolve over
time in response to the actions taken by the players at that time in response to institutional and cultural
incentives. A fully forward looking model of institutional change is analytically intractable when joined
with cultural dynamics; see Bisin and Verdier (2017) for a discussion and Lagunoff (2009) and Acemoglu,
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Civil Society. Each generation consists of a continuum [0, 1] of citizens. Civil society
is composed of two types i of citizens: religious individuals (i = Re) in proportion qt in
generation t, and secular individuals (i = S) in proportion 1 − qt . Citizens employ effort
in production activities. Total production is qt eRe,t + (1 − qt )eS,t , where ei,t , i = Re, S is
the per-capita work effort employed by an individual of type i in generation t.
Ruler and Clerics. The ruler lives off taxing civil society at a tax rate τt . The tax base
which the ruler has access to is the total production of citizens: Et = qt eRe,t + (1 − qt )eS,t .
The ruler also contributes to building and maintaining religious infrastructures, mt ≥ 0,
for the clerics to provide religious services. The total religious services provided for the
society are mt · αc,t , where αc,t ≥ 0 is the effort of the (representative) cleric at time t. The
building of religious infrastructures has cost C(mt ) that the ruler pays for. Meanwhile,
clerics pay for the daily maintenance costs F (mt ) of these infrastructures.15
Legitimacy. Clerics can provide the ruler with legitimacy through religious services which
facilitate governance and obedience for religious individuals. We focus on the role legitimacy plays in tax collection (e.g., Coşgel and Miceli 2009, Levi and Sacks 2009, Wintrobe
1998). In particular, citizens are more likely to defer to tax authorities when governance
is viewed as legitimate, and they likewise may feel better about paying taxes to a divinely
sanctioned political authority.16 This is the source of the political power for religious authorities. However, this power is limited by the fact that religious legitimacy only operates
on the religious component of civil society. In our formulation, religious individuals, when
e
smaller than the actual τ chosen
taxed by the ruler, subjectively perceive a tax rate τRe,t
by the ruler and decreasing in the religious effort of the clerics, αc,t :
e
τRe,t
= τt (1 − θαc,t ).

(1)

Egorov and Sonin (2015) for forward looking institutional change. Some historical motivation for myopic
institutional change in the study of the emergence of democracy is found in Treisman (2020).
15
These costs are assumed to be increasing in mt and sufficiently convex to satisfy a regularity condition,
needed to ensure that when religious clerics have a high political weight λt in the institutional structure,
the policy problem associated to institutional design is well behaved, and provides a finite equilibrium
provision of m.
16
This is just one of the several dimensions of the ruler’s governance ability which are affected by legitimacy.
Importantly, for instance, legitimacy lowers the likelihood of revolt (Bentzen and Gokmen 2022, Cantoni,
Dittmar and Yuchtman 2018, Chaney 2013, Gill 1998, Gilley 2008, Greif and Rubin 2022, 2023, Guo 2003,
Hechter 2009, Hurd 1999, Johnson and Koyama 2019, Platteau 2017, Rubin 2017, Tyler 2006).
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e
For secular individuals, τS,t
= τ .17
As a consequence, the total level of taxes collected is increasing in the cleric’s effort,
αc,t , and the efficiency of the legitimating technology. We denote the exogenous component
of the legitimating technology by θ ∈ [0, 1], and we interpret it as the efficiency of religious
legitimacy in encouraging compliance with authority.

Proscriptions. Religious services have an indirect cost, in that they require the imposition
of various proscriptions (i.e., regulations and constraints) on individual behavior. We
interpret these proscriptions as a signal on the part of the clerics to civil society as a
whole of their power in society. Importantly, therefore, these proscriptions are imposed
on both religious and secular individuals.18 Examples of these types of proscriptions are
inheritance laws, prohibitions on technologies such as printing, and usury restrictions on
the entire credit market. We capture the effect of religious proscriptions by assuming that
the cost of individual production effort is
c(αc,t )Φ(ei,t ), with Φ(ei,t ) =

e2i,t
and c(αc,t ) = 1 + ϕαc,t , i = Re, S.
2

(2)

The parameter ϕ > 0 represents the degree of restrictiveness of religious proscriptions on
economic activities.19
Preferences. Preferences of the agents in this society in any generation t are as follows.
The ruler has utility
Ur (mt ) = τt Et − C (mt ) .
(3)
17

Alternatively, and likewise, we could assume that when clerical effort and the legitimating technology are
greater, fewer religious citizens evade taxes (Coşgel and Miceli 2009, Greif and Rubin 2022). Another
interpretation is that religious individuals work for public service, e.g., in the army or in the judicial
system, for lower pay.
18
These are the types of proscriptions that typically have the largest effect on economic growth. We are
not concerned with other types of prohibitions that only affect religious believers, such as certain dietary
restrictions or marriage or divorce restrictions (Freidenreich 2013, 2015, Tolan 2019). As a matter of fact,
the model could be amended to allow secular individuals to be less affected than religious individuals by
the cost of religious proscriptions. In such a case, it can be shown that this increases the likelihood of a
long run theocratic state compared to a secular state. See footnote 31 for a discussion.
19
The parameter ϕ is held as exogenous in the model, even though there are clearly endogenous elements
of religious proscriptions (Rubin 2011, Seror 2018). In fact, both Islamic law and Christian (canon) law
changed over time to address economic exigencies (Berman 1983, Hallaq 1984, 2005, Noonan 1957, 2005).
Nonetheless, note that the effective cost of economically-inhibitive religious proscriptions c(αc,t ) = 1+ϕαc,t ,
is actually an outcome of the “religious” political-economy equilibrium. Consequently the effective impact
of the restrictiveness of religious proscriptions on economic development depends on the relative weight of
religious authorities in political decision-making, which is endogenous in the model.
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Clerics derive utility mt · αc,t from religious services, at effort cost Ψ(αc,t ).20 The utility of
the clerics therefore is
Uc (mt , αc,t ) = mt · αc,t − Ψ(αc,t ) − F (mt ).

(4)

Finally, the utility of agents of type i = Re, S in civil society is
e
Ui (ei,t ) = ei,t (1 − τi,t
) − c(αc,t )Φ(ei,t ),

i = Re, S.

(5)

We assume the cost functions C(.), F (.) and Ψ(.) are increasing and convex in their argument.21
This setup establishes—somewhat starkly—one of the model’s fundamental building
blocks: the trade-off between religious legitimacy and religious proscriptions with respect
to the size of the taxable surplus. Legitimacy increases the incentive to provide effort for
the religious (or alternatively, lowers their incentive to evade taxation), but comes at the
cost of lowered productivity due to proscriptions.
Policy. Policy choices are not necessarily the sole responsibility of the ruler. They are,
in general, the outcome of a collective choice problem in any given generation t, reflecting
the political power and preferences of the three groups, and representing indirectly the
political economy process in society (Bisin and Verdier 2017).22 In other words, policies
are the outcome of a “bargain” implicit in the institutional structure of society. More
specifically, this is how the choice of religious infrastructures mt , over which both religious
clerics and civil society have a say, is made in our model.23

20

In various times and places, such as “Golden Age” Islam or medieval Europe, religious authorities were
also directly involved in economic activities. Although we do not explicitly model this possibility here,
it follows from our setup that religious authorities can benefit from a greater economic surplus since it
provides more revenue for expenditure on religious services.
21
We also assume that F ′ (m) < C ′ (m) for all m > 0; i.e., that the marginal cost of infrastructure maintenance
is smaller than the marginal cost of building infrastructures.
22
In turn, the relative political power of the groups is endogenously determined in the model; see Section
3.2.
23
Religious infrastructures represent generally, in the logic of our model, all those policies which are the
outcome of political economy factors and whose effects are not fully internalized by the political economy
process (and over which the political economy process does not have full commitment). With respect to
all these policies, the institutional forces identified in our analysis will be salient.
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The relative political power of the groups is captured by their respective weight in the
social welfare function Wt , which is the objective of policy choices.24 Specifically, the social
welfare function Wt to be maximized by the policy choice mt is:
1
λt
1 − λt
Wt = Ur (mt ) + Uc (mt , αc,t ) +
[qt URe,t (eRe,t ) + (1 − qt )US (eS,t )] .
2
2
2

(6)

Fixing the relative power of the ruler (to 21 ),25 the power of the clerics and of civil society
t
is, respectively, λ2t and 1−λ
with λt ∈ [0, 1].
2
Each generation’s societal equilibrium will obtain as the ruler, clerics and agents in
civil society choose, respectively, τt (≤ τ ) 26 , αc,t , and ei,t (for i = Re, S,) to maximize
their utility given by (3), (4), and (5), respectively. The policy choice mt is determined
by the institutional bargaining process to maximize (6). At a societal equilibrium in each
generation t, the ruler, the policy-maker, the clerics, and civil society, take as given i) the
distribution of power between the groups in society, λt ; as well as ii) the distribution of
religious and secular types in civil society, qt . But both the distribution of power and the
distribution of types in civil society are endogenously determined in society. In the next
section, we study first the societal equilibrium for any t and then the dynamics of λt and
qt in the model.

3

Societal Equilibrium and Dynamics

At any time t, for a given institutional power structure of the different groups and a given
population profile of religious and secular individuals, the societal equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium of the simultaneous game between the ruler, the policy-maker, the clerics, and
civil society. The non-cooperative nature of choices captures the idea of a public choice
environment plagued by externalities and lack of commitment, whereby policy-makers and
agents do not internalize the full impact of their behavior on society.
24

In accordance with our interpretation of the political economy process, the social welfare function Wt
can be thought as the objective of a “fictitious policy-maker,” who makes decisions based on the political
weight of each segment of society.
25
This is just for simplicity and concreteness: all that is needed is that the ruler has large enough power
with respect to the other members of society.
26
τ < 1 is associated to the fiscal capacity of the ruler (ie. the maximum tax rate he can implement in this
economy.)
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On the other hand, institutional change arises as a mechanism to internalize the externalities associated with the political process, given the changing cultural composition of
society (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019, Bisin and Verdier 2017, Iyigun, Rubin and Seror
2021). Cultural dynamics derive from purposeful inter-generational transmission, emanating from parental socialization and imitation of society at large (Bisin and Verdier 2001,
2017).

3.1

Societal Equilibrium

At a societal equilibrium for generation t, the choices of τt , αc,t , and ei,t (i = Re, S) and mt
constitute a Nash equilibrium, denoted by {τt (λt ), mt (λt ), αc,t (λt ), eS,t (λt ), eRe,t (λt )}.27
It is easy to see that the equilibrium tax rate τt (λt ) is equal to its maximum possible
value τ , indicating fully extractive taxation.28 In order to simplify notation, we write τ
instead of τ̄ = τt (λt ) in the remainder of the paper. The comparative statics at equilibrium
in any period t are summarized in the following Lemma. For notational convenience, we
suppress the time subscript t in the rest of this section.
Lemma 1 Religious infrastructures: The equilibrium investment in religious infrastructures, m(λ), and the equilibrium effort of the clerics, αc (λ), are increasing in λ and
independent from θ and ϕ.
When the weight of the clerics in social choice increases, so does the marginal benefits of
provisioning the religious infrastructure m. In turn, the clerics increase their own effort in
provisioning religious services αc (λ). Since the weight of the clerics in social choice is λ2 ,
both αc (λ) and m(λ) increase with λ.
In the model, clerics do not derive utility from imposing proscriptions on economic
activity nor from legitimating the ruler. Hence, the investment in religious infrastructure
m(λ) and the provision of the religious services αc (λ) are independent from θ and ϕ.
Lemma 2 Labor effort: The equilibrium effort of secular individuals eS (λ) is decreasing
)
in λ and ϕ and is independent from θ. On the other hand, as long as θ ≥ ϕ(1−τ
, the
τ
27

The equilibrium is fully characterized in the Appendix. Since there is a complementarity between the
provision of the religious good mt and the investments of the clerics in religious infrastructures αc,t ,
the uniqueness of the equilibrium is not guaranteed. Under mild conditions, however, the equilibrium is
uniquely determined.
28
In the societal equilibrium, the ruler takes as given citizens’ efforts and does not internalize the negative
effect of taxation on the tax base. Therefore he chooses the maximum possible tax rate τ .
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equilibrium effort of religious individuals eRe (λ) is increasing in λ and θ, and is decreasing
in ϕ.
When the efficiency of the clerics to legitimate the ruler θ increases, so does the effort of
religious individuals who subjectively perceive a lower tax rate. By contrast, the efficiency
of the legitimizing technology has no effect on the effort of secular individuals. An increase
in the degree of restrictiveness of religious proscriptions, ϕ, leads to lower efforts from both
the religious and secular individuals, as harsher proscriptions decrease individuals’ labor
productivity.
The political weight of the clerics affects labor efforts through αc (λ), the equilibrium
effort of the clerics. While more effort from the clerics αc (λ) makes secular individuals
reduce their own labor effort—through costly regulations and prohibitions ϕ—when θ ≥
ϕ(1−τ )
, clerics have the opposite effect on the labor effort of religious individuals eRe . This is
τ
because when clerics provide more effort, the religious individuals perceive a lower tax rate.
Despite costly religious regulations, they increase their effort due to higher investments in
religious infrastructures. In order to make this key difference between secular and religious
individuals stark, we make the following Assumption:
Assumption 1 θ ≥

ϕ(1−τ )
.
τ

We denote the tax base as E(λ) = qeRe (λ) + (1 − q)eS (λ). From the two previous
Lemmas, we deduce the following result:
Lemma 3 Tax base: Under Assumption 1, the tax base is increasing in q and θ, and it
)
.
is decreasing in ϕ. It increases with λ as long as q ≥ ϕ(1−τ
τθ
While religious infrastructures increase the scope of religious proscriptions, they also positively affect the effort of the religious individuals under Assumption 1. Hence, when
religious individuals are sufficiently numerous, the latter effect dominates, and the tax
base E(λ) increases with the effort of the clerics αc (λ), so it increases with λ. Similarly,
since θ positively affects the labor effort of religious individuals, it also positively affects
the tax base. Religious proscriptions ϕ negatively affect the tax base, as they decrease
labor efforts. The tax base increases with the fraction of religious q, who provide greater
effort than their secular counterparts.
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3.2

Institutional Dynamics

Each generation brings about institutional change in the relative power to be delegated
to clerics and civil society in the future; that is, at the end of any generation t, λt+1 is
chosen from the point of view of the social welfare function with weight λt .29 In other words,
institutions are exogenous from the perspective of all players at any point in time but change
over time to reduce externalities associated with the decisions made by policymakers.30
More formally, at any time t, given institutions λt , future institutions λt+1 are designed as
the solution to:
1
λt
max Ur (mt (λt+1 )) + Uc (mt (λt+1 ), αc,t (λt+1 ))+
λt+1 2
2
1 − λt
[qt URe (eRe,t (λt+1 )) + (1 − qt )US (eS,t (λt+1 ))] . (7)
2
Institutional change between periods t and t + 1 therefore internalizes two externalities
that are not taken into account by the optimal decisions characterizing the Nash equilibrium
of period t. The first one relates to the fact that the provision of religious infrastructures
m grants legitimacy to the ruler, reducing the subjectively perceived tax rate for religious
individuals. The second is the fact that it also has a depressing effect on labor productivity
via proscriptions. Hence, increased provision of the religious good m not only affects the
utility of the clerics, but also feeds back into the utility of both the ruler and the citizens.
Solving the optimization problem (7), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 The optimization problem (7) admits a unique solution λt+1 ∈ [0, 1]. The
solution is characterized by a threshold q(λt ) ∈ [0, 1] such that,
λt+1 > λt (resp. ≤), if qt > q(λt )(resp. ≤).
Furthermore, the threshold q(λt ) is decreasing in θ and increasing in ϕ.
29

We assume that institutional design is myopic, anticipating only socio-economic outcomes one generation
ahead. This implies that the institutional structure does not internalize institutional “slippery slopes,”
whereby moving to a different structure of decision rights may in turn trigger subsequent institutional
changes leading to undesirable outcomes from the point of view of the initial structure. See Bisin and
Verdier (2017) for a discussion of how this issue can be accounted in the kind of framework.
30
In this sense, our conception of institutional change follows in the spirit of Greif and Laitin (2004), Greif
(2006), and Bisin and Verdier (2017) in that institutions change over time in response to the actions taken
by the relevant players at a point in time given the incentives they face at that time. As in our conception
of λt , such “quasi-parameters” (to use the term coined in Greif and Laitin (2004)) are exogenous to all
players in period t but change over time in response to their actions.
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The uniqueness result follows from the convexity of the optimization problem. Whether
more power is delegated to the clerics over time depends on the fraction of religious individuals qt . A larger weight to the clerics λt+1 > λt increases their effort αc (λt+1 ). This in
turn increases the utility of the ruler Ur —who benefits from a larger tax base (Lemma 3).
When the religious are sufficiently numerous, this also increases the total welfare of the
citizens qt URe + (1 − qt )US . In such a case, while secular individuals suffer from religious
proscriptions, civil society as a whole can still benefit from higher effort from the clerics.
Indeed religious individuals are better off when they perceive a lower tax rate, and they
reflect a large enough share of the population.31
Relative to the comparative static results, when the strength of religious proscriptions ϕ
increases, so does the cost for the ruler of using religious legitimacy as a means of extracting
resources from the population. The parameter space over which λt increases shrinks as q
increases. On the other hand, when clerics are efficient at legitimating the ruler, i.e. when
θ increases, then delegating power to the clerics is more beneficial and q decreases.

3.3

Cultural Dynamics

Cultural dynamics are modeled as purposeful inter-generational transmission (Bisin and
Verdier 2001, 2017) through parental socialization and imitation of society at large. Direct
vertical socialization to the parent’s trait i ∈ {Re, S} occurs with probability di . If a
child from a family with trait i is not directly socialized, which occurs with probability
1 − di , he/she is horizontally/obliquely socialized by picking the trait of a role model chosen
randomly in the population.32 The probability Pij that a child in group i is socialized to
trait j writes as:
Pii = di + (1 − di )qi
(8)
Pij = (1 − di )qj ;
with qRe = q and qS = 1 − q. We assume that the probability of direct socialization di
is the solution of a parental socialization problem33 in which: a) parents are paternalistic
31

Note that if secular individuals suffer less than religious individuals from religious proscriptions, an increase in the clerics’ weight λt is more likely to happen as civil society as a whole is less affected by the
economic cost of such religious proscriptions. Formally, the threshold q(λt ) becomes smaller when religious
proscriptions are less satisfied by secular individuals than by religious individuals.
32
Vertical, horizontal, and oblique transmission are the core mechanisms in the dual-inheritance theory of
cultural evolution. For more, see Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985).
33
See Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2000, 2001) for a similar approach in different contexts and Bisin and Verdier
(2011) for a survey of the economic literature on cultural transmission.
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(i.e., imperfectly altuistic) and have a bias for children sharing their own cultural trait; b)
such paternalistic bias writes as ∆Vi (λt ) = Vii (λt ) − Vij (λt ), where Vij (λt ) = Ui (ej (λt )) is
the utility perceived by a type i parent of having a type j child, for i, j ∈ {Re, S} and
j ̸= i; c) parents of type i ∈ {Re, S} have socialization costs that are increasing and convex
in di ; d) religious infrastructures mt may act as complementary inputs to the transmission
effort dRe of religious families in the socialization of children to the religious trait.
More specifically, denote hRe (dRe , mt ) the socialization cost of religious families and
hS (dS ) the socialization cost of secular families. Then religious parents solve the following
socialization problem:
max −hRe (dRe , mt ) + PReRe · VReRe (λt ) + PReS · VReS (λt ),
dRe

(9)

while secular parents solve the following socialization problem:
max −hS (dS ) + PSS · VSS (λt ) + PSRe · VSRe (λt ).
dS

(10)

As shown in the appendix, the solution of (9) provides the equilibrium socialization
effort of religious families d∗Re,t = DRe [(1 − qt )∆VRe (λt ), m(λt )], which is an increasing
function of both (1 − qt )∆VRe (λt ) and m(λt ). Similarly, the solution of (10) defines the
equilibrium socialization effort of secular families d∗S,t = DS [qt ∆VS (λt )], which is an increasing function of qt ∆VS (λt ). In addition, the dynamics of the proportion of the population
with the religious trait is characterized by the following “cultural replicator” dynamics:
qt+1 − qt = qt (1 − qt ){d∗Re,t − d∗S,t }.

(11)

In equation (11), the term
D(qt , λt ) = d∗Re,t − d∗S,t = DRe [(1 − qt )∆VRe (λt ), m(λt )] − DS [qt ∆VS (λt )] ,
can be interpreted as the relative “cultural fitness” of the religious trait in the population.
This term is frequency dependent (i.e., it depends on the state of the population qt ). It
is also affected by the institutional environment λt , as this variable interacts with the
process of parental cultural transmission both through paternalistic motivations ∆Vi (λt ),
and through the provision of religious infrastructures mt = m(λt ) as a complementary
input to religious family socialization.
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In other words, there is a complementarity between religious legitimacy and the profile
of religious values in the population. We deduce the following result:
Proposition 2 There exists a threshold q ∗ (λt ) such that
qt+1 < qt (resp. ≥) if qt > q ∗ (λt )(resp. ≤).
Furthermore, the threshold q ∗ (λt ) is increasing in θ and λt and decreasing in ϕ.
Because the process of cultural transmission (8) is characterized by cultural substitution
between vertical and oblique transmission, the relative “cultural fitness” of the religious
trait D(qt , λt ) is decreasing in the frequency qt of religious individuals in the population
(Bisin and Verdier 2001). Consequently, the proportion q ∗ (λt ) such that D(q ∗ (λt ), λt ) = 0
is the unique attractor of the cultural dynamics in (11). When the fraction of religious
individuals qt is above (resp. below) q ∗ (λt ), then it decreases (resp. increases) in order to
converge in the direction of q ∗ (λt ).
The dependence of the threshold q ∗ (λt ) on the institutional environment λt and comparative statics on the parameters θ and ϕ depends on how the relative “cultural fitness”
D(qt , λt ) of the religious trait is affected by changes in such features.
An increase in the political weight of the clerics λt affects cultural transmission in two
ways, through its effect on socialization incentives ∆VRe (λt ) and ∆VS (λt ) and through its
effect on religious infrastructures, m = m(λt ). On the one hand, an increase in λt promotes
e
by religious
the clerics’ effort αc (λt ) and consequently leads to a lower perceived tax rate τRe
individuals. The labor effort choice of religious and secular individuals is therefore further
apart and, consequently, the incentives of parents to socialize their children to their own
cultural trait, ∆VRe (λt ) and ∆VS (λt ), are larger in both groups.34 However when the
socialization effort of religious parents is more sensitive to these incentives than the effort
of secular parents, the religious trait is relatively more successfully transmitted than the
secular trait, and D(qt , λt ) is shifted up with an increase in λt . On the other hand, an
increase in λt also increases the amount of religious infrastructures m = m(λt ). When such
infrastructures enter as complementary inputs in the socialization process of the religious
trait, then again religious parents tend to socialize more intensively than secular ones when
m increases. The religious trait has consequently higher cultural fitness than the secular
34

Given the quadratic specification of the utility function Ui (ei ), and substituting the optimal labor efforts
(τ θαc (λt ))2
in the utility of the citizens, one finds that ∆VRe (λt ) = ∆VS (λt ) = 2(1+ϕα
, which is increasing in λt .
c (λt ))
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trait and again D(qt , λt ) is shifted up with λt . In either situation, the diffusion of the
religious trait is favored by an increase in λt , and q ∗ (λt ) becomes larger.
A change in the other parameters θ and ϕ affects the relative cultural fitness of the
religious trait only through their induced changes on the paternalistic motives ∆VRe (λt )
and ∆VS (λt ). For instance, a higher efficiency of the clerics θ tends to widen the gap
between the optimal work effort of a religious individual compared to that of a secular
individual. As a consequence, an increase in θ shifts up both ∆VRe (λt ) and ∆VS (λt ).
As mentioned above, when religious parents are more sensitive to paternalistic motives
than secular parents, these shifts lead religious parents to socialize more intensively than
secular parents, and religious values are passed from generation to generation with a higher
intensity. This results in a higher value of q ∗ (λt ). Conversely, a higher value of religious
proscriptions ϕ dampens the impact of work effort on economic outcomes. Consequently,
behavioral differences induced by cultural traits are less relevant from a utility point of
view. This in turn reduces the paternalistic motives ∆VRe (λt ) and ∆VS (λt ) of religious
and secular parents. The effect of a change in proscriptions ϕ on cultural evolution is then
qualitatively the opposite of that of a change in θ.

4

Model Dynamics and Historical Narrative

In this section we draw the implications of the model with regards to the joint dynamics
of culture and institutions and match them with various salient elements of the historical
narrative regarding Middle Eastern and Western European political economy during the
medieval and early modern periods. To this end we proceed as follows.
In Section 4.1 we represent the dynamics of the model by a phase diagram. To this
end we exploit the characterization we obtained in the previous section of the dynamics’
stationary states, their stability properties, and their basins of attraction, as a function of
structural parameters and initial conditions. In Section 4.2 we exploit relevant historical
information to draw a qualitative mapping of structural parameters and initial conditions
for the Middle East and the West into the basins of attraction of the different dynamics
identified by the model. Finally, in Section 4.3 we match the model’s implied dynamics
for these two regions to the historical narrative regarding the Long Divergence as well as
other characteristics of the political economy patterns of the history of these regions.35
35

Random economic shocks or uncertainty regarding the parameters would help provide a closer map with
historical narratives. For instance, the re-emergence of European commerce around 1000CE could be
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4.1

The Joint Dynamics of Culture and Institutions

Under the conditions of Propositions 1 and 2, we can represent the joint cultural and
institutional dynamics in the phase diagram of Figure 2. The solid black line represents
the threshold of the institutional dynamics q(λt ). The dotted line represents the threshold
q ∗ (λ) associated with the cultural dynamics.36 The arrows in Figure 2 depict the joint
dynamics of culture and institutions, given our results in Propositions 1 and 2.
Figure 2: Joint Dynamics of Culture and Institutions
λ(t)
1

A

q ∗ (λt )

q(λt )
I

III
II

IV
1 q(t)
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construed as one such shock, as could the Mongol invasions of the Middle East or the Black Death. We
stick to a deterministic model, however, since allowing for such stochastic structure should not change the
qualitative insights of the model, while the analytical complexity would increase by orders of magnitude.
36
It can be shown that q ∗ (0) = 0, and that q(0) > 0 with q ′ (0) > 0. Under parametric conditions ensuring that q(1) < q ∗ (1), continuity of q(λ) and q ∗ (λ) implies that q(λ) necessarily cuts from below q ∗ (λ)
characterizing an interior steady state point (q ∗ , λ∗ ) as shown in Figure 2. Such a point can be shown to
be a saddle point steady state of the joint dynamics of culture and institutions, leading formally to the
possibility of institutional divergence away from (q ∗ , λ∗ ). See Appendix A.6 for details.

20

Stationary states. As described in the figure, the joint dynamics of culture and institutions in this society display two steady states.37 The first one could be characterized
as a religious regime represented by point A in Figure 2, where the ruler is legitimated
by religion, clerics have significant political power (λt is high), taxation is high (the tax
rate τ is maximal and the tax base E is high), and the share of religious individuals in
civil society is high (q is high). The second steady state, point B in Figure 2, could be
characterized as a secular regime where the ruler is not legitimated by religion, clerics have
little political power (λt is zero), taxation is limited (the tax rate τ is maximal but the tax
base E is small), and civil society is secular (q is small). Two mechanisms characterize the
dynamics.
Monotonic convergence paths. In regions I and IV of Figure 2, the ruler’s option to
rely on religious legitimacy to increase tax capacity induces a fundamental complementarity
between religious legitimacy and the profile of religious values in the population. On the one
hand, religious elites provide services to the religious component of civil society, which shape
civil society’s moral beliefs that support a moral obligation to obey the ruler, which in turn
lowers the subjective tax rate for the religious. Institutions delegating power to clerics (i.e.,
high λt ) therefore reinforce the incentives of religious individuals to transmit their values.
This in turn increases the relative share of the religious in the population. In addition, a
higher fraction of religious individuals in the population augments the political incentives
for the ruler to delegate power to clerics to increase legitimacy. This complementarity then
operates to produce dynamics converging to the religious regime, as represented by point
A in Figure 2 or to the secular regime, as represented by point B. In these regions, the
complementarity between culture and institutions locks-in society to one of the two stable
equilibria.
Non-monotonic convergence paths. In regions II and III of Figure 2, the dynamics
are not characterized by complementarity and hence by monotonicity. In these regions of
the phase diagram, a “horse race” arises between cultural and institutional change. The
“winner” of the horse race determines which stable equilibrium—religious or secular—
emerges in the long run. In region II, for example, religious individuals are insufficiently
numerous and λt decreases over time. At the same time, religious values grow: as the
37

q(λ) and q ∗ (λ) may intersect more than once at some interior point. This would provide other steady states
whose dynamic stability will alternate between saddle points and stable points. The qualitative discussion
of our analysis about institutional and cultural divergence between secular and a religious steady states
are not affected by these possibilities.
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religious trait is not widespread, religious individuals invest more in direct socialization
(Bisin and Verdier 2001). Depending on the speed of institutional change relative to
cultural change, the joint dynamics can either reach region I or region IV. Region II may
give rise to a transitory path to the religious equilibrium when the religious population
grows fast despite the political weight of the clerics decreasing over time. This might occur
because, being in the minority, religious parents have higher incentives to exert effort
transmitting their cultural trait to their child. In this case, religious individuals become
sufficiently numerous at some point that the course of institutional change is reversed, and
the political power of religious clerics starts to grow after a transitory period. In region III,
religious individuals are sufficiently numerous for the political power of the religious clerics
to increase over time. But the religious population is too large, so secular individuals invest
more in direct socialization. Again, depending on the speed of institutional change relative
to cultural change, either region I or region IV could be reached by the joint dynamics.
If the religious population decreases faster than religious institutions grow, we can expect
the joint dynamics to reach region IV. In this case, the religious population becomes so
low after a transitory period that the political weight of the clerics decreases over time and
equilibrium B is reached in the long-run.
Comparative dynamics. The basin of attraction of each stationary state—the subset
of initial conditions from which the dynamical system converges to this state in the phase
diagram in Figure 2—depends on the parameters of the society. Since the size of each
basin of attraction can be interpreted as a likelihood of reaching that stationary state, it
is important for our analysis to characterize their dependence from the efficiency of the
legitimating technology of the clerics, θ, and the degree of restrictiveness of the religious
proscriptions imposed by the clerics, ϕ; see Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3 The size of the basin of attraction of the religious (resp. secular) stationary state is increasing (resp. decreasing) in religious legitimacy θ and decreasing (resp.
increasing) in the restrictiveness of religious proscriptions ϕ.
As an illustration, consider the basin of the religious state (the one of the secular
state is the complement). A higher efficiency of the clerics θ—by definition—decreases the
subjectively perceived tax rate of the religious. As a consequence, religious parents have
a higher willingness to transmit their cultural values inter-generationally. At the same
time, clerics become more important in the institutional apparatus, as they increase social
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welfare by (i) lowering the perceived cost of effort and (ii) increasing the rents extracted
by the ruler. Therefore, the complementarity between the spread of religious values and
institutional changes delegating power to the clerics is reinforced when θ is higher. On the
other hand, when the degree of religious proscriptions ϕ increases, the cost for the ruler
from using religious legitimacy as a means of extraction also increases. The threshold q(λt )
consequently increases. Similarly, greater religious proscriptions makes the religious trait
less resilient, as the threshold q ∗ (λt ) associated with the cultural dynamics decreases. This
explains why the complementarity between the spread of religious values and institutional
changes delegating power to the clerics is weakened.

4.2

Historical Parameters and Initial Conditions

In the historical context we study—Western Europe and the Middle East over the period
starting from the the end of the Western Roman Empire in the West and the emergence
of Umayyad Caliphate in the Middle East until the onset of the Reformation in Europe
and the capture of the Egyptian Mamluk Empire by the Ottoman Empire—the historical
literature has identified several key differences between the regions.
Parameters θ and ϕ. Muslim religious authorities had greater capacity to legitimate than
their Christian counterparts. This is due to the environment in which the religions were
born. Christianity was born in the Roman Empire and was in no position to legitimate
the emperor. Early Christian doctrine is reflective of the low legitimating capacity of
Christianity (Feldman 1997, Rubin 2011). For instance, Jesus famously said “Render unto
Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” (Matthew
22:21). Meanwhile, Islam formed conterminously with expanding empire, and there are
numerous important Islamic dictates specifying the righteousness of following leaders who
act in accordance with Islam (Hallaq 2005, Rubin 2011, 2017). There are several Qur’anic
passages and hadiths (reports of the teachings of Muhammad, which are among the most
important sources of authority in Islam) supporting this idea. Among the most explicit is
Qur’an passage 4:59: “O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and
those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the
Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best
in result.” This passage suggests that one should follow those in authority, but only if they
rule in accordance with Allah. In short, the growing corpus of Islamic doctrine motivated
rulers to employ religious authorities for all sorts of functions, including legitimating the
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state. This legitimating relationship became codified as the corpus of Islamic doctrine,
including the most trusted hadiths, was formulated in the first Islamic centuries. We
denote this as the “exogenous component” of the legitimating technology, or θ. In the
context of our model, these historical differences are mapped into a higher θ for the Islamic
Middle East.
Secondly, economically-inhibitive religious proscriptions existed—and in fact abounded—
in both Christianity and Islam. Although it is not clear whether they were initially more
restrictive in Western Europe or the Middle East, they persisted for much longer in the
latter. For instance, Kuran (2005, 2011) cites how Islamic law regarding partnerships and
inheritance combined to discourage long-lived or large business ventures. Partnerships
would be split among numerous heirs upon the death of any partner, any of whom could
dissolve the enterprise. More generally, Islamic law, as formulated in the first few centuries
of Islam, covers numerous aspects of commercial life. Another well-known set of proscriptions are those related to usury, which persisted for over a millennium in both Islam and
Christianity (Noonan 1957, Rubin 2011, 2017). This longer persistence of religious prescriptions in the Islamic world is naturally mapped into more restrictive growth inhibiting
proscriptions—that is, a higher ϕ—in the Middle East.38
Initial conditions q and λ. At the starting point of our analysis of the Middle East, the
beginning of the Umayyad Caliphate in 661CE, the “Islamic world” was not thoroughly
Muslim. In fact, it was not so for at least a few centuries after the onset of Islam, which
first spread along trade routes before spreading into other Muslim-controlled territory (Ensminger 1997, Michalopoulos, Naghavi and Prarolo 2016, 2018). Though Islamic political
authority spread quickly, reaching Spain in the west and the Indian subcontinent in the
east within its first century under the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750), “Muslims still formed
a small part of the populace... [Umayyad] authorities, who realized that this would deprive
them of much-needed tax revenue, did not encourage conversion” (Bessard 2020, p. 18).39
In the context of our model, this suggests a “low q” initial condition in the Middle East.
Finally, as we already noted, Islam was born conterminously with empire, to the point
that in its first few decades (through the end of the first Caliphate in 661CE), political
38

Note that the Islamic word may involve more economically costly proscriptions even when the degree of
restrictiveness of religious proscriptions ϕ is the same as in the Western world. Indeed, what is important
is the fact that the political dynamics lead to a higher intensity of clerics’ efforts αc (λ) in the Middle East,
which in turn increases the cost of restrictions in that region.
39
For more on the role that tax revenue, particularly the jizya tax on non-Muslim subjects, played in
conversion goals, see Saleh and Tirole (2021).
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and religious authority was concentrated in the ruler. The first four Muslim caliphs (632–
661CE), who were all companions of Muhammad, claimed to have religious authority vested
in themselves. Their successors, the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750CE), attempted to make
similar claims, although less successfully given their distance from the Prophet—they had
the bloodlines of Muhammad, but were not his companions (Crone and Hinds 1986). This
maps directly, in our model, into a high initial λ.
In summary, despite the population largely being non-Muslim, initially at least, the
legitimating relationship between rulers and religious authorities was clearly codified in
the the Islamic Middle East during the early Middle Ages. These historical characteristics
can be mapped, in the context of our model, into “low q, high λ” initial conditions.
The historical characteristics of Western Europe, following the fall of the Roman Empire, were somewhat orthogonal to those we identified for the Middle East. First of all,
the Roman population had largely become Christianized in the fourth and fifth centuries,
so that Christianity was predominant in the Germanic “follower kingdoms.” On the other
hand, again as a consequence of the environment in which Christianity was born, the
political power of the church was relatively small, to the point that the Germanic “follower kingdoms” were not initially ruled by Christians. We map therefore these historical
characteristics of Western Europe into “high q, low λ” initial conditions in the model.

4.3

Matching Model Dynamics and Historical Trajectories

Qualitatively, the structure of the parameters and the initial conditions we have identified
from the historical narratives in the previous section suggest a mapping into region II of
Figure 2 for the Islamic Middle East and into region III of Figure 2 for the Christian
West. We consider the Christian West and the Islamic Middle East in turn, providing a
match between the dynamics implied by the model starting from these regions and the
documented historical trajectories.
Christian West. Our mapping of the Christian West into region III of Figure 2 following
the fall of the Western Roman Empire implies that the West could have converged to either
the secular or the religious stationary state in the long-run. The implied dynamics from
this region are sensitive to slight variations in their initial conditions and they depend on
the relative speed of cultural and institutional change. Since the exogenous component
of the legitimating technology, θ, was relatively low in the Christian West, Proposition 3
indicates that the basin of attraction should be larger for the “secular” stationary state
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than it was for the Muslim Middle East. Importantly, however, the paths to this basin of
attraction, should these paths reach the basin, are not monotonic: they allow for historical
trajectories characterized by early institutional changes whereby rulers delegated power to
religious clerics to gain religious legitimacy in the face of a largely religious civil society,
before turning back to secular institutional structures.
These transitory, non-monotonic dynamics of institutions indeed characterized Western
Europe until the 11th century (although not in Northern Europe, which was Christianized
between the 8th and 12th centuries). We begin the analysis after the fall of the Western
Roman Empire in 476CE. As noted above, the Christian West was in a “high q, low λ”
state at this starting off point. The model’s dynamics (see region III of Figure 2) suggest
that the institutionalized use of religious legitimacy (λ) should increase initially, while the
population should become less religious. At some point, depending on which of these effects
occurs more rapidly, a basin of attraction will be reached whereby either a “secular” or
“religious” equilibrium emerges.
In fact, following the fall of the Roman Empire, the vast predominance of a Christian
civil society provided a strong incentive for Germanic rulers to either convert to Christianity
or promote Christianity. For instance, the Frankish king Clovis (r. 481–509) converted and
employed Christianity to legitimate his Frankish expansion into new territory (Tierney
1970, Rubin 2017, pp. 62–63). Likewise, the Visigoths converted to Christianity under
Recared (r. 586–601), with the Church serving as an important source of legitimacy until
they were overrun by Muslim invaders in 711. Germanic rulers ultimately became among
the leading defenders of Christianity, with Charlemagne’s crowning by the pope in 800CE
the most visible manifestation.
Around 1000 CE, the re-birth of commerce gave rise to independent cities and increased
tensions between the religious and secular elite (Angelucci, Meraglia and Voigtländer 2021,
Rubin 2011). Although we do not model the re-emergence of trade endogenously—indeed,
it can be viewed as an exogenous shock relative to the political economy environment we
model—it had clear implications for the institutional and cultural dynamics at the heart of
the model. The rebirth of commerce entailed that religious proscriptions (ϕ in our model),
such as the ban on usury, were more economically harmful. In the absence of widespread
trade prior to the Commercial Revolution, such proscriptions had little dampening effect
on the economy. Yet, they became increasingly harmful as trade flourished (Rubin 2011).
Using the terminology of our model, the increase in ϕ combined with the relatively low θ
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increased the basin of attraction of the “secular equilibrium,” encouraging rulers to break
with the Church as a primary means of legitimation.
The most important event in this break was the Investiture Controversy (1075–1122),
a conflict between various secular rulers and the papacy over the role of the former in religious affairs. The Investiture Controversy took place in part due to the political economy
dynamics noted above. In response to growing secular power over religious affairs, Pope
Gregory VII (r. 1073–85) issued a series of reforms regarding the role of secular rulers in
Church affairs, including investiture. Although there was back and forth between rulers
and the Church, by this point the value of religious legitimation was on the decline, and
a movement towards the basin of attraction of the “secular equilibrium” had commenced.
The Investiture Controversy culminated with the Concordat of Worms in 1122. In the following two centuries, the Church sought to impose its own set of laws (canon law) across
Europe, but to no avail. Rulers, lords, merchants and other elites increasingly turned to
other forms of law that covered manorial relations, merchant activity, urban codes, and
royal jurisprudence (Berman 1983). With respect to legitimating arrangements, European
rulers increasingly sought alternative justifications for their rule (i.e., further lowering λ)
(Tierney 1988, pp. 33–95). They found these alternative justifications in the universities,
where leading scholars provided justification for secular rule based on Aristotelian thought,
while others helped codify various branches of secular law such as merchant law, feudal law,
and manorial law (Berman 1983, Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014, Hollenbach and Pierskalla
2020). By the 14th century, the papacy was under the thumb of the French king. The
entire papal court was moved to Avignon from 1309–76. This transition can be seen in the
type of advice given to monarchs on the “art of ruling.” Blaydes, Grimmer and McQueen
(2018) find that it was precisely in this period that European political advice texts began
to de-emphasize religious appeals.
As a whole, these events helped place much of Western Europe on a path towards the
more “secular” equilibrium described in our model. Institutional change in the direction of
more political power to the Church did not arise fast enough, especially after the Investiture
Controversy gave local rulers greater suzerainty over their lands. In the context of the
model, Western Europe thus ultimately ended up in region IV of Figure 2—the basin of
attraction that results in a “secular equilibrium”. In this region, the declining political
power of religious clerics reinforced cultural changes that placed less emphasis on religious
values. These reinforcing mechanisms ultimately resulted in lock-in, whereby there was
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little role for religious authorities in legitimating political rule, and more political power
rested in civil society.
The Reformation played a key role in further secularizing civil society. In the context
of the model, such secularization is necessary for a society to reach region IV of Figure 2.
In England, Greif and Rubin (2022) argue that following the Reformation, the political
power of religious authorities dropped significantly and the law (as formed in Parliament)
became a key source of royal legitimacy. In Germany, Cantoni, Dittmar and Yuchtman
(2018) find that, following the Reformation, there was a massive reallocation of resources
and education from religious to secular purposes. In other words, where the Reformation
undermined the political power of the Church (i.e., lowered λ), less cultural capital was
invested in religious pursuits. This is precisely the type of lock-in the model predicts will
arise in a society in region IV.
Islamic Middle East. Our qualitatively mapping of the Middle East initially (i.e., after
661CE) into region II of Figure 2 suggests historical trajectories somewhat specular with
respect to those of the West: convergence to the religious stationary state in the long-run
but through historical trajectories characterized by early institutional changes whereby
rulers limited the power of religious clerics early on, before turning back to a strategy of
delegation in exchange for legitimacy which led society to a religious stationary state.
Following the rapid political spread of Islam in its first few decades under the First
Four Caliphs (632–61), institutional change away from a strong clerical class certainly,
though slowly, transpired in the Islamic Middle East. The merchant class saw a rise in
its economic and political power in the first few centuries of Islam (Bessard 2020, ch. 9).
A common currency and political institutions facilitated a massive expansion of trade.
The Umayyad and Abbasid states sponsored markets and provided privileges for leading
merchants, directly involving themselves in urban retailing to “establish their power and
legitimacy from the first decades of the eighth century” (Bessard 2020, p. 5). This was
not just a period of economic growth; it was also the “Golden Age” of rationalist Islamic
thought. Islamic science, technology, mathematics, architecture, and medicine were the
envy of Western Eurasia. Hence, there were indeed forces pushing against the political
power of religious elites (i.e., lower λ, as is predicted in region II).
Yet, these forces did not move fast enough to reach the basin of attraction in which a
“secular” equilibrium emerged in the long run. Throughout the Middle East and North
Africa, religious elites retained their key role in various ruling coalitions. This was largely
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the case throughout the Umayyad period and early Abbasid period: religious authorities
provided administrative services to a largely non-Muslim population. After 661, the Sunni
successor empires (the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates) employed Islamic religious authorities to legitimate rule, provide jurisprudence, and administer imperial rule. Although
the population was not yet Islamized, religious authorities served a central role in administering the state. Most important was their role in providing legal services and overseeing
various aspects of state administration. With respect to the early Abbasid Empire (8th
century), Hallaq (2005, p. 182–83) writes:
[T]he government was in dire need of legitimization, which it found in the circles
of the legal profession. The legists served the rulers as an effective tool for
reaching the masses, from whose rank they emerged and represented ... Jurists
and judges emerged as the civil leaders who, though themselves products of
the masses, found themselves involved in the day-to-day running of their affairs
... [T]he judges were not only justices of the court, but the guardians and
protectors of the disadvantaged, the supervisors of charitable trusts, the taxcollectors and the foremen of public works. They resolved disputes, both in the
court and outside it, and established themselves as the intercessors between the
populace and the rulers.
As a result, the Umayyads and their successors, the Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258CE),
relied on legitimacy supplied by religious authorities. Especially after the religious establishment consolidated in the ninth century (Coşgel, Miceli and Ahmed 2009, Hallaq 2005,
Rubin 2017), religious authorities were the primary agents capable of determining whether
rulers acted in accordance with Islam (i.e., whether secular authorities and Allah “disagreed over anything”, to quote the Qur’anic passage cited above). This relationship was
formally institutionalized with the rise of the madrasa system in the 11th century and the
diversion of resources away from secular intellectual pursuits (e.g., science, mathematics)
and into religious learning (Chaney 2016, Kuru 2019).
Importantly, as posited in our model, the Middle East became Islamicized prior to an
unraveling of political power for religious clerics. In the context of Figure 2, this placed
much of the Muslim Middle East in the basin of attraction of a “religious equilibrium”
(region I). In the model, as in Bisin and Verdier (2001), the dominant cultural group
(initially, non-Muslims) had less incentive to pass down their cultural traits, especially
when the institutional structure was not aligned with their cultural (religious) beliefs.
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Institutional pressures favoring the minority culture can incentivize conversion to that
culture. In the Islamic context, such institutionalized incentives were provided via taxes
on non-Muslims (jizya).40 In Egypt, for example, Saleh (2018) finds evidence of massive
conversions of lower socio-economic status Copts into Islam: by 1200, Muslims were 80% of
the Egyptian population, and by 1500 they were over 90% of the population. Saleh (2018)
argues that negative selection among Copts was due to the poll tax that non-Muslims had
to pay; those that could not afford it simply converted to Islam.
This history is consistent with the dynamics predicted in our model. As a society
approaches the basin of attraction of the “religious equilibrium,” religious culture reinforces
clerical political power, and a religious stationary state becomes locked-in in the long run.
In the Middle East and North Africa, this equilibrium was characterized by a massive
expansion in madrasas (Chaney 2016, Kuru 2019), less frequent “rationalist” interpretation
of Islam in favor of traditionalist interpretation (i.e., the “closing of the gate of ijtihād ”
(Coulson 1969, Hallaq 1984, 2001, Schacht 1964, Weiss 1978)), and almost zero political
bargaining power for the economic elite (Pamuk 2004a,b).
Two examples from two different periods and regions highlight the reinforcement of
Muslim institutions and culture in a “high q, high λ” world. First, Chaney (2013) finds
that medieval Egyptian religious authorities were more secure in their rule (e.g., higher λ)
when the Nile flooded or there was a drought. This is precisely when a ruler would most
need religious legitimacy, both because the tax base would be lower and because there
was a greater threat of revolt. Moreover, as noted above, this was a period of increasing
Islamization of the Egyptian population (i.e., q was increasing). This suggests the presence
of a “high q, high λ” equilibrium, with cultural and institutional forces reinforcing each
other.
A second example comes from the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, where the
population had largely converted to Islam centuries prior to Ottoman expansion (i.e., q
was high). In the late 15th century, the Ottomans brought the religious establishment into
the state, establishing the office of the Grand Mufti (chief religious jurist). This gave the
Ottomans significant power to formulate controversial decisions in a manner consistent with
Islam (Imber 1997). Meanwhile, the reinforcement of institutions and culture strengthened
after the Ottomans conquered the Egyptian Mamluk Empire (in 1517) and took control
40

While we do not explicitly model discriminatory taxes, religious legitimacy works as such a tax in the
model, given the presence of religious proscriptions. Formally including an explicit discriminatory tax
would strengthen the results.
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over Mecca and Medina, the two holy cities of Islam. This further enhanced the capacity
of clerics to confer legitimacy by associating the ruler with Islamic piety (e.g., mentioning
the name of the legitimate ruler in each Friday sermon or supporting obedience to the ruler
in judicial rulings) (Hallaq 2005, ch. 8). Thus, the high level of religious legitimacy (θ)
provided by Muslim clerics resulted in a “high q, high λ” equilibrium for much of Ottoman
history.

4.4

The Long Divergence through Lens of the Model

Our model squares two of the leading theories of the “Long Divergence,” and in doing so
directly addresses one stylized fact highlighted in the literature: the persistence of religious
legitimacy in the Middle East and the secularization of politics in Western Europe. The
model suggests that the diverging long-run paths of the economies of these two regions—
“high q, high λ” in the Middle East and “low q, low λ” in Western Europe—were in part
a result of the relatively high efficacy of religious legitimacy (θ) in the Islamic world. This
meant that the two regions had different responses to religious proscriptions (ϕ), which were
not necessarily stronger in either region. In Western Europe, once commerce revived in the
11th and 12th centuries, religious proscriptions were sufficiently economically damaging to
push society towards the basin of attraction that ultimately resulted in a low q, low λ
equilibrium. On the other hand, in the Islamic world such religious proscriptions may
have been even more economically damaging at the time, given that the Islamic world was
ahead of Europe. However, the relatively high θ in Middle Eastern societies helps account
for the presence (and persistence) of strict religious proscriptions in a “high q, high λ”
equilibrium. Although proscriptions diminish the attractiveness of religious legitimacy to
rulers and of passing down religious traits to one’s child, proscriptions are mitigated for the
ruler if religious legitimacy is effective enough (i.e., θ is high) and enough of the population
is religious (i.e., q is high). Hence, supporting economically-inhibitive religious doctrine is
more than worth it for a ruler in a high-q society when θ is also large.
These insights therefore unify Kuran’s theory emphasizing religious proscriptions with
theories emphasizing religious legitimacy (Kuru 2019, Platteau 2017, Rubin 2017). Kuran’s
theory centers not just on the fact that religious proscriptions existed in Islamic law, but
that they persisted for so long after they were useful. Our theory sheds light on the how
religious culture reinforced clerical political power, and vice versa, which resulted in the
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persistence of religious proscriptions. Meanwhile, an emphasis on religious proscriptions
reveals why legitimating arrangements changed over time in Europe.
These insights also shed light on a second stylized fact central to the literature: the
long-run economic vibrancy of Western Europe relative to the Middle East. Even though
there are welfare-enhancing properties of religious legitimacy (as highlighted in the model),
these welfare gains can be overwhelmed by religious proscriptions. As Kuran (2011) points
out, such proscriptions can have unforeseeable, path dependent consequences for economic
growth. For instance, Islamic partnership law and inheritance law jointly discouraged
larger enterprises, which ultimately stifled the creation of anything remotely resembling the
corporate form (Kuran 2005, 2011). Meanwhile, the persistent dominance of Islamic law
over commercial transactions entailed the slow (or non-) adoption of new organizational
forms and financial instruments from abroad, which itself had numerous unforeseeable
economic consequences (Kuran and Rubin 2018, Rubin 2010, 2017).
So far, our model does not account for the third major theory of the Long Divergence:
Middle Eastern rulers had more unconstrained power relative to other elites (i.e., European
governance was more limited). As such, it cannot account for an important stylized fact
mentioned in the introduction: the growth in limited governance in Western Europe but
not the Middle East. Blaydes and Chaney (2013) ascribe the relatively greater power of
Middle Eastern rulers to their access to slave soldiers, which gave rulers access to coercive
power without ceding political power. Meanwhile, weaker European rulers had greater
incentive to negotiate with their economic (i.e., feudal) elites for revenue and military
power, since they had little capacity to rule otherwise (Duby 1982). Throughout Europe,
rulers also ceded power to urban burghers, who had relative freedom from imperial rule
(Angelucci, Meraglia and Voigtländer 2021, Mann 1986, Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti
1994, Schulz 2020). More generally, this meant that Muslim rulers had fewer constraints
on their power, which a large literature suggests is harmful for economic growth (Acemoglu
and Robinson 2012, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005b, North and Weingast 1989,
North, Wallis and Weingast 2009, van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker 2012). Our model
currently does not permit the ruler to share power with other (secular) elites that may
constrain her, so it cannot speak to the conditions under which this occurs. In the next
section, we extend the model to consider how the devolution of political power interacts
with the various parameters of importance in our model (namely, θ and ϕ).
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5

Religious Legitimacy and Limited Governance

In this section we extend and enrich the model introduced in Section 2 by considering the
emergence of limited governance. Pre-modern states tended to have little fiscal capacity
or capacity to provide law and order to regions far away from the capital. Administrative
capacity tended to be quite weak in most parts of the world, meaning that rulers could
not easily implement their desired policies (Besley and Persson 2014, González de Lara,
Greif and Jha 2008, Greif 2008, Ma and Rubin 2019). As such, there was a limit to the
potential tax revenue available to rulers that was well below the optima on a Laffer curve
(Besley and Persson 2009, 2010, Dincecco 2009, Johnson and Koyama 2017). This issue is
(implicitly) central to the framework proposed by Blaydes and Chaney (2013). Without the
capacity to collect revenue on their own, pre-modern rulers had to delegate tax collection
to powerful agents. Such powerful agents could deter tax evasion via force and more easily
assess taxable surpluses. More importantly, these powerful agents could limit what the
ruler could do because they held the power of the purse.
The degree to which rulers had to delegate tax collection (and, more generally, the
administrative functions of the state) depended on their own power vis-à-vis other elites.
According to Blaydes and Chaney (2013), Muslim rulers had to delegate less because they
had access to slave soldiers. This meant they did not need local elites for military service
or, oftentimes, tax collection. Meanwhile, feudal arrangements in medieval Europe were
such that local taxes were collected by powerful local elites, and in return rulers received
military service and, occasionally, tax revenue.
We study the interactions between rulers and local elites in a political economy model
where political power is divided between three groups: the ruler, religious clerics, and a
secular elite (e.g., feudal lords, parliament, or the military). This allows us to incorporate
into the model a fundamental element of the socio-economic environment under study, as
discussed in the Introduction: a tradeoff between religious legitimacy and limited governance with respect to the state’s fiscal capacity. This, in turn, allows us to study the
conditions under which the ruler shares political power with the secular elite, who have
the capacity to collect taxes.
We treat secular elites as representatives of the citizenry. In terms of the distribution
of power between groups, we assign the “ruling coalition” the combined weight of the ruler
= 1 − λ2 , in social welfare. This is similar to the baseline
and the secular elites, 12 + 1−λ
2
model, with the citizenry being replaced by the secular elites. In other words, if the ruler
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and the secular elites are the “ruling coalition” (as in North, Wallis and Weingast 2009),
then 1 − λ2 is the total weight of the coalition. Clerics have weight λ2 and citizens have no
political power (i.e., zero weight).41
The secular elite enforces tax compliance and it shares with the ruler the tax surplus
of the government. The share of this surplus accruing to the ruler vis-a-vis the secular
elites is β ∈ [0, 1].42 As a simple illustration, a regime where λ = 1 can be interpreted as
a theocracy, while λ = 0 is a dictatorship when β = 1, and a republic when β = 0, as
the ruler does not benefit from tax revenue in the latter case. It is therefore the tradeoff
between β and λ that determines the state’s fiscal capacity.
α2
We denote αl ∈ [0, αl ] the enforcement effort of the secular elites, with αl > 0. Let µ 2l ,
µ > 0, be a quadratic cost associated with this effort. The utility of the secular elites can
be expressed as:
α2
Ul (m, αl ) = (1 − β)[τ E − C(m)] − µ l .
(12)
2
Consider now the utility of the ruler. We assume the ruler faces a cost ραl when letting
the secular elite enforce tax compliance αl . For instance, medieval European rulers provided
feudal lords with lands to administer. Tax enforcement was accompanied with the hiring
and building of a force capable of violence by these lords. These elements suggest that the
more the ruler cedes to lords the power of tax enforcement, the larger is the military power
of the lords, which may eventually be turned against the ruler herself. The cost ραl is a
simple way to capture such threats. We maintain the assumption that the maintenance
cost of religious infrastructures paid by the clerics is F (m). The utility of the ruler is then
Ur (m) = β(τ E − C(m)) − ραl ,
and the utility of the clerics is:
Uc (m, αc ) = mαc − Ψ(αc ) − F (m).

41

This is a simplification to reduce the dimensionality of the dynamics of institutions while expanding the
qualitative features of the narrative of the interactions between ruler, clerics, and citizens we analyzed in
Section 3.
42
This set-up captures the idea that there is an implicit bargaining process within the ”secular ruling coalition” (ruler and secular elite) that is related to the institutional governance structure, and which determines
how the two parties share the rents extracted in society. This institutional structure implies in particular
that the equilibrium level of religious infrastructure only depends on the weight of the clerics relative to
that secular ruling coalition, independently from the structure of power within the coalition.
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In order to focus on the institutional implications of endogenous tax enforcement, we
also simplify the production structure of the economy. More precisely, we assume that all
1
of
citizens are now endowed with one unit of resource out of which they produce 1+ϕα
c,t
the consumption good. They then face the dichotomous choice of complying or not with
tax collection. When an individual of type i ∈ {Re, S} complies with taxation, he pays the
effective tax rate τ on his output, while enjoying from a welfare point of view, a “perceived”
tax rate τi,t , with as before τRe,t = τ (1 − θαc,t ) and τS,t = τt . When the individual decides
to evade tax collection, he faces an expected consumption penalty which depends on two
factors: i) the capacity of tax enforcement on the part of the elites, and ii) the capacity
of that individual to escape taxation. More precisely, denote by ϵ(αl,t ) a measure of the
capacity of tax enforcement by the elites, increasing in the elite’s tax collection effort αl,t .43
Assume as well that each individual has an idiosyncratic (inverse) capacity to evade taxes
c drawn from a uniform distribution on a segment [0, c], with c > 0. An individual with
characteristic c who does not comply with tax collection incurs an expected consumption
penalty cϵ(αl,t ).44 In this modified version of the model, the expected utility of an individual
belonging to type i ∈ {Re, S} with an (inverse) evasion capacity c is then:45
(
Ui =

5.1

1−τi,t
1+ϕαc,t
1−cϵ(αl,t )
1+ϕαc,t

if the individual complies
otherwise

.

(13)

Societal Equilibrium and Dynamics

The societal equilibrium in generation t is a Nash equilibrium of the game between the ruler,
clerics, secular elite, and civil society. In this equilibrium, the religious infrastructures m
are chosen to maximize social welfare,


λt
λt
[Ur (mt ) + Ul (mt , αl,t )] + Uc (mt , αc,t ).
1−
2
2

(14)

ϵ0
For analytical convenience, we assume ϵ(αl,t ) = 1−α
, so that ϵ0 ∈ (0, 1) is the enforcement level when
l,t
the secular elites are not providing an effort (αl,t = 0). For simplicity, we also assume that the maximum
enforcement level that the secular elite can undertake αl,t is less than 1 − ϵ0 , so that ϵ(αl,t ) always lies in
the interval [ϵ0 , 1].
44
This consumption penalty is “burned out” and not recovered by tax collectors.
45
With this specification of production, we highlight the distortions associated with the extensive margin of
taxation, rather than the intensive margins of labor effort as in the base model. Introducing the intensive
margin of production effort does not change the qualitative conclusions of this section, at the cost of
increased analytical complexity.
43
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The clerics and the secular elite choose, respectively, αc,t and αl,t . We denote {mt (λt ),
αc,t (λt ), αl,t (λt , βt )} the equilibrium. In the rest of this section, we omit the time indices
when not necessary. Solving the equilibrium in any period t, we obtain the following results:
Lemma 4 Religious infrastructures: The equilibrium investments in religious infrastructures m(λ) and the optimal effort of the clerics αc (λ) are increasing in λ, and independent from β, θ, and ϕ.
Lemma 5 Tax enforcement: The equilibrium enforcement effort of the secular elite
αl (λ, β) is decreasing in β, λ, q, θ, and ϕ.
Lemma 4 is similar to Lemma 1 in the previous model and has the same intuition.
Lemma 5 highlights several results. First, when the ruler receives a larger share of the
tax revenues β, the secular elite invests less in enforcing tax collection. Second, since
individuals subjectively perceive a lower tax rate when clerics provide more effort, they
also comply more with taxation, reducing the need for the secular elite to supply their
own enforcement effort. Additionally, more effort from the clerics implies more religious
proscriptions, which depress citizens’ labor productivity, and decreases the proceeds of the
tax collection. This also decreases the effort provided by the secular elite in enforcing the
tax collection. Hence for both reasons, the clerics’ legitimizing effort αc , and the secular
elite tax enforcement effort αl are strategic substitutes with respect to building up the tax
base of society. Consequently, given that clerics provide more effort when they are more
powerful (i.e. when λ is higher), the secular elite is conversely less willing to enforce the
tax collection in such a case: (i.e., αl (λ, β) decreases with λ).
The same intuition explains both the effect of a higher frequency q of religious individuals and of more efficient clerics θ on the effort of the secular elite αl . Finally, when
the degree of religious proscriptions ϕ gets stronger, the proceeds of the tax collection are
reduced, so the secular elite also provides less tax enforcement effort.
We now turn to the analysis of institutional change, i.e., the change in the structure
of political weights across society. The ruler can delegate power to the clerics λ and also
constrain herself to share more revenues with the secular elites by decreasing her own
fraction β of fiscal revenues.
Institutional change internalizes two types of externalities that are not taken into account by equilibrium individual decisions. First, as in the previous model, the religious
provision m grants legitimacy to the ruler, reducing the subjectively perceived tax rate
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of religious individuals while at the same time depressing labor productivity because of
religious proscriptions. Second, institutions now also respond to the externality implied by
the enforcement effort αl of the secular elite on the fiscal revenue received by the ruler. By
committing to share the proceeds of tax collection, the ruler can indirectly induce greater
fiscal capacity for her own benefit. This is the trade-off at the heart of this extension of
the model.
Hence, given the current institutional structure (λt , βt ), future institutions (λt+1 , βt+1 )
are designed as the solution to:


λt
max
1−
[Ur (mt (λt+1 ), αl,t (λt+1 , βt+1 )) + Ul (mt (λt+1 ), αl (λt+1 , βt+1 ))] +
λt+1 ,βt+1
2
λt
Uc (mt (λt+1 ), αc,t (λt+1 )),
2

(15)

with {mt (λt+1 ), αc,t (λt+1 ), αl,t (λt+1 , βt+1 )} denoting the Nash equilibrium of period t, as
evaluated under an institutional set-up (λt+1 , βt+1 ). Solving this optimization problem, we
deduce the following results which characterize the institutional dynamics:
Proposition 4 When C(m) and F (m) are sufficiently convex, the optimization problem
(15) admits a unique solution (λt+1 , βt+1 ) ∈ [0, 1]2 and:
there exists a threshold q d (λt ) ∈ [0, 1] such that if qt > q d (λt ), then λt+1 > λt . Otherwise,
λt+1 ≤ λt . Moreover q d (λt ) is decreasing in λt ;
there exists a threshold q̃d (λt , βt ) ∈ [0, 1] with q̃d (λt , 1) = 1 such that if qt > q̃d (λt , βt ),
then βt+1 > βt . Otherwise, βt+1 ≤ βt . Moreover, the threshold q̃d (λt , βt ) is decreasing
in λt and increasing in βt .
The uniqueness result follows from the convexity and the separability of the two dimensions of the optimization problem (15). This result highlights the trade-off between
religious legitimacy and limited governance with respect to the state’s fiscal capacity, and
the role that the cultural profile (qt ) plays in tipping the balance of this trade-off. As
before, whether the ruler delegates more power to clerics over time depends on the fraction
of religious individuals qt . If the religious are sufficiently numerous, then more weight to
the clerics λt+1 > λt increases their effort αc,t (λt+1 ). This will increase the utility of the
ruler, who benefits from a larger tax base (Lemma 4). Second, when the religious are
sufficiently numerous, the political weight of the secular elite relative to the ruler tends
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to decrease, βt+1 > βt . As the ruler becomes more reliant on religious legitimacy to raise
revenues, he also faces weaker incentives to delegate power to the secular elite and to build
fiscal capacity.
Cultural evolution of the religious and secular traits is driven by some process of intergenerational transmission emanating from paternalistic parents and oblique social role
models. The formal features of the cultural dynamics need, however, to be amended to the
new specification of production and taxation as outlined above.46 Again one may compute
the paternalistic motives ∆VRe and ∆VS to transmit the religious and the secular trait in
this context. As shown in the appendix, due to the quadratic specification of the expected
payoff functions, these paternalistic motives simply write as functions of the state variables
λt , βt , and qt such that ∆VS = ∆VRe = ∆V (λt , βt , qt ).47 The dynamics of the frequency of
the religious trait is again characterized by the following “cultural replicator” dynamics:
qt+1 − qt = qt (1 − qt )D(qt , λt , βt ).

(16)

where again
D(λt , βt , qt ) = d∗Re,t − d∗S,t
= DRe [(1 − qt )∆V (λt , βt , qt ), mt (λt )] − DS [qt ∆V (λt , βt , qt )]
is the relative “cultural fitness” of the religious trait in the population, and in general
depends on the three state variables λt , βt , and qt . When the cultural substitutability
between vertical and oblique transmission is strong enough, the relative “cultural fitness”
of the religious trait D(λt , βt , qt ) is decreasing in the frequency qt of religious individuals
in the population and we deduce the following result:
Proposition 5 With strong enough cultural substitution between vertical and horizontal
cultural transmission, there exists a unique threshold qd∗ (λt , βt ) such that
qt+1 < qt (resp. ≥) if qt > qd∗ (λt , βt ) (resp. ≤).
46

When deciding on their optimal socialization effort, parents take into account that their children will draw
in their adult life an idiosyncratic evasion capacity c, which matters for their decision to comply or not
with taxation.
47
Because the equilibrium tax collection effort αl (λ, β, q) of the secular elite enters into the paternalistic
motives, we may note that ∆V (λt , βt , qt ) now also depends on qt and is actually an increasing function of
qt (see the appendix).
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As before, the threshold qd∗ (λt , βt ) is the unique attractor of the cultural dynamics (16).
Hence, when the fraction of religious individuals qt is above (resp. below) the threshold
qd∗ (λt , βt ), it tends to decrease (resp. increase).

5.2

Model Dynamics and Historical Trajectories

The joint dynamics of culture and institutions in this society are now three dimensional:
the two institutional parameters, λt and βt , and the cultural component qt evolve jointly,
as characterized in Propositions 4 and 5. A full characterization of this dynamic system
is difficult. Still one can derive some insights on the forces behind the joint dynamics
by investigating how the thresholds q d (λt ), q̃d (λt , βt ), and qd∗ (λt , βt ), which characterize
respectively the dynamics of λt , βt , and qt , are themselves affected by the state variables.
As in the benchmark model, there is a fundamental complementarity between the dynamics of culture and institutions. To see this, note first that because q d (λt ) is decreasing
in λt , from Proposition 4, the political weight of the religious clerics λt keeps increasing
(resp. decreasing) over time as soon as it is above (resp. below) a threshold λ(qt ) defined by
q d (λ) = qt . A strong (resp. weak) clerics’ institutional representation is reinforced (resp.
weakened) over time. This feature creates a force towards an institutional steady state
characterized as a religious institutional regime with λ = 1, or on the contrary a secular
institutional regime with λ = 0. Also, given that the threshold λ(qt ) is decreasing in qt , the
reinforcing dynamics for the religious institutional regime are facilitated (resp. weakened)
when the religious (resp. secular) trait is already well disseminated in society.
Conversely, from Proposition 5, qd∗ (λt , βt ) is increasing in the institutional weight λt of
the clerics. As before, a religious institutional regime with a high value of λt stimulates
more religious infrastructures and reinforces the incentive of religious individuals to pass
their values inter-generationally. Religious values are more widely diffused within a religious institutional regime, while secular values widely prevail under an secular institutional
regime.
With respect to the dynamics of limited governance βt , Proposition 4 reveals that βt
is more likely to increase as qt and λt become larger. Indeed, as the threshold q̃d (λt , βt )
is decreasing in λt and increasing in βt , the condition for βt+1 − βt ≷ 0 rewrites as βt ≶
βed (λt , qt ) with βed (λt , qt ) increasing both in λt and qt . This feature underlines a force for
the system to move in the direction of a steady state level of limited governance βed∗ that
is increasing both in the level of institutional power λ of the clerics, and the extent q of
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religious values prevailing in the society. The more religious the society and the more
diffused the religious values in the population, the larger the religious legitimacy enjoyed
by the ruler, and the lower the need to empower the secular elite.
Qualitatively, the previous discussion indicates that the joint dynamics of culture and
institutions entails the possibility of two steady states. The first is a religious regime with
unlimited governance, where the ruler has a strong say on fiscal revenues (β is high) and
is legitimated by religion, while the clerics have significant political power (λ = 1). Fiscal
capacity is low, as the secular elite have minimal incentives to enforce tax collection. The
share of religious individuals in civil society is high (q is high). The second steady state is
a secular regime with limited governance. The ruler is fiscally weak while the secular elite
is strong (β is low). The clerics have little political power (λ = 0), while fiscal capacity is
high given that secular elites have strong incentive to enforce tax collection. At the same
time, the share of religious individuals is low (q is low).
In the appendix, we show that the previous discussion can be made analytically more
precise in the case where the threshold of the cultural dynamics qd∗ (λt , βt ) does not depend on βt . The dynamics of λt and qt are then decoupled from the dynamics of βt and
follow the same pattern as in the benchmark model. Depending on the initial conditions
(λ0 , q0 ), (λt , qt ) converge towards a religious regime (1, qd∗ (1)) or a secular regime (0, qd∗ (0)) .
Associated with these dynamics, the society converges towards unlimited governance with
β1∗ = βed (1, qd∗ (1)), or limited governance β0∗ = βed (0, qd∗ (0)) < β1∗ . This case is depicted in
Figure 3, where the threshold q̃d (λt , βt ) for a given value of βt is represented by a solid
black line in the space {qt , λt }. The arrows indicate the joint dynamics of culture and
institutions, given our results in Propositions 4 and 5. Morever the direction of change of
βt is summarily indicated, decreasing towards limited governance β0∗ or increasing towards
unlimited governance β1∗ .
Monotonic convergence paths. As in the benchmark model, a ruler’s option to rely
on religious legitimacy induces a fundamental complementarity between the dynamics of
culture and institutions. When a ruler relies more on religious legitimacy to raise revenues,
she also faces increasingly lower incentives to delegate power to the secular elite and to
consolidate fiscal capacity. As she becomes fiscally stronger relative to the secular elite,
she also commits to an institutional set-up delegating more power to the clerics, leading to
increased diffusion of religious values in the society. In turn, the predominance of religious
individuals augments the political incentives to bias the institutional structure towards
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Figure 3: Joint Dynamics of Culture and Institutions with Limited Governance
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both the clerics and the ruler. This dynamic complementarity between institutions and
culture operates in region I + of Figure 3. It produces a process converging towards a
religious regime with unlimited governance, as represented by point A.
Alternatively, when a ruler relies less on religious legitimacy to raise revenues, she also
faces stronger incentives to delegate power to the secular elite, who consequently consolidate
fiscal capacity. As the ruler becomes more reliant on her secular elite to collect taxes, she
accordingly faces lower incentives to commit to an institutional set-up where religious clerics
are powerful. Both the political weight of the clerics and the value of passing religious values
inter-generationally decrease. A lower predominance of religious individuals in society
and a lower legitimacy to directly raise taxes further augments the political incentives to
consolidate fiscal capacity by empowering the secular elite. This dynamic complementarity
between institutions and culture operates in region IV − of Figure 3. It produces a process
converging towards a secular regime with limited governance, as represented by point B.
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Non-monotonic convergence paths. In all the regions of Figure 3 except I + and
IV − , the dynamics are not characterized by complementarity and hence by monotonicity.
Similar to Section 4, in these regions of the phase diagram, a “horse race” arises between
cultural and institutional change. In the case where the threshold of the cultural dynamics
qd∗ (λt , βt ) does not depend on βt , these transitory paths are essentially similar to those
described in Section 4.

5.3

Matching Model Dynamics and Historical Trajectories

This extension allows us to unify the three main theories of the “Long Divergence.” It
takes seriously the idea that rulers can be constrained by other powerful elites in society
and searches for the conditions under which this is likely to happen. Importantly, it does
so in the context of the previously-established framework in which religious legitimacy and
religious proscriptions play a role in determining the joint evolution of institutions and
culture.
We first consider the relationship between limited governance and fiscal capacity. This
relationship is central to the extension proposed in Section 5. Recall that Western Europe
became more limited politically (via parliaments and other organizations that constrained
executive power) in the medieval and early modern periods but the Middle East did not.
There is a large literature claiming that states in which fiscal capacity and the “power
of the purse” are held by groups outside of the central executive are able to collect more
taxes due to greater constraints on executive power (Besley and Persson 2009, Dincecco
2009, Karaman and Pamuk 2013, Ma and Rubin 2019, North and Weingast 1989, Stasavage
2011, 2020). Our model adds additional insight to this literature by shedding light on the
process through which limited governance, as we define it, engenders cultural change (i.e.,
secularization) that reinforces the state’s fiscal capacity. One of our primary insights is
that rulers will only devolve political authority when the returns from religious legitimacy
are sufficiently low. This in turn triggers cultural change to a more secular society. On
the contrary, when society is religious, the returns from religious legitimacy may be high
even when religious proscriptions impinge on productive effort. In this case, culture and
institutions evolve in tandem and society becomes more religious over time.
Section 5 highlights multiple reasons why European political institutions became more
limited in the medieval period. First, following the fall of the Western Roman Empire,
European rulers had little fiscal power relative to other elites. In the terms of our model,
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their initial level of β was low. This also follows from the framework of Blaydes and
Chaney (2013), who argue that European rulers were weak relative to other elites because
they lacked access to independent sources of military power, unlike Muslim rulers who
could employ slave soldiers.
However, an explanation relying solely on limits on governance placed by secular elites
leaves a major question unanswered. If Muslim rulers were so strong relative to other elites,
why should they have feared devolving some of their power to those “secular” elites, which
could have yielded more tax revenue? Even as late as the early modern period, Ottoman
tax collection was notoriously low (Karaman and Pamuk 2013). Why did the Ottomans
not give more power to local notables, who would have almost certainly had more capacity
to collect taxes? These elites should not have been a threat to Muslim rulers. After all,
rulers had slave soldiers and local elites did not.
Our model provides insights which help resolve this puzzle. It suggests that the ruler’s
fiscal power relative to other elites (β) interacted with the greater legitimating capacity of
Muslim religious authorities. Muslim rulers failed to devolve political power not because
they feared that other elites would become too strong. They did so because devolution
of power to secular elites would have resulted in a weakening of the efficacy of religious
legitimacy. Granting more power to secular authorities would have encouraged a cultural
shift to a more secular state, yielding religious legitimacy less effective. Given the relative
efficacy of religious legitimacy, this would not have been an optimal strategy for a Muslim
ruler. This was exacerbated by access to slave soldiers, which gave rulers more power
vis-à-vis other elites. However, as the model indicates, this relative power (β) changes
endogenously over time. Just because Muslim rulers had an initial advantage vis-à-vis
other elites does not explain why it persisted.
The opposite was true in medieval Western Europe. The relatively weak initial power of
rulers combined with the relatively weak legitimating capacity of the Church incentivized
rulers to devolve political power. This ultimately yielded a secular equilibrium in which
religious proscriptions barely impinged on economic development.
These insights accord well with the historical record. Medieval feudal institutions gave
lords—secular lords as well as powerful bishops—great power over their local domains,
and in return lords provided military service and tax revenue to their sovereign (Duby
1982). Over the course of the late medieval and early modern periods, parliaments became the primary institution which bargained with European rulers (Angelucci, Meraglia
and Voigtländer 2021, van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker 2012). Parliaments allowed the
43

economic elite to gain representation at the political bargaining table, and they generally
included three classes: the landed nobility, powerful churchmen, and commercial/urban
elite. As warfare became more expensive, European rulers ceded more to these elites, who
could provide them with revenue (Gennaioli and Voth 2015, North and Weingast 1989,
Stasavage 2011, Tilly 1990). Ultimately, parliaments became the main tool for constraining rulers, which resulted in a massive increase in fiscal capacity (Dincecco 2009, Johnson
and Koyama 2017, North and Weingast 1989, Tilly 1990, van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker
2012).48
On the other hand, in the Middle East economic power was decentralized but political
power remained relatively unconstrained (Coşgel and Miceli 2005, Karaman and Pamuk
2013, Karaman 2009). In early Islam, under the Umayyad Caliphate, regional governors
subject to imperial control administered and collected taxes. This differed both from
feudal European as well as the pre-existing Byzantine systems in that these governors
were not locally dominant aristocratic families subject to little discretion from the center.
They were not as powerful and had relatively little fiscal independence from the center
(Bessard 2020, p. 37–38). Centuries later this was still the case. At the height of Ottoman
power in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the sultan derived two-thirds to threequarters of his revenue through the tımar system, a military lease contract whereby the
provincial cavalry collected agricultural taxes directly from the peasantry as remuneration
for their military services to the state (Coşgel and Miceli 2005). The tımar system was
similar to the tax collection system of feudal Europe, where local feudal lords controlled
revenues in return for military service. However, a key difference between the two is that
European feudal lords also had political power: their families ruled over their domains
for generations, providing local law and order, collecting taxes, and representing them in
parliament. On the other hand, tımar holders were rotated every few years precisely so that
they would not acquire local political power. All political power remained vested in the
sultan and key religious authorities, not tımar holders. Unlike European elites, who were
ultimately able to constrain their rulers and receive concessions in return for revenue, tımar
holders never organized collectively in any manner close to resembling a parliament, and
Ottoman rulers remained relatively unconstrained (Balla and Johnson 2009). As a result,
the economic elite rarely had any real political power in the Ottoman Empire (Pamuk
2004a,b). Meanwhile, religious legitimacy remained important (as discussed in Section
48

For theoretical treatments of the rise of state capacity and its affect on economic development, see Acemoglu
(2005) and Besley and Persson (2009, 2010, 2014).
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4.3), and as a result sultans ceded purview over commercial law to religious authorities,
and the associated proscriptions dampening economic activity lasted for centuries (Kuran
2011).
These insights also help account for another stylized fact of the Long Divergence: Middle
Eastern fiscal capacity was much greater than in Western Europe in the centuries following
the spread of Islam, but there was ultimately a reversal of fortunes, with Western European
fiscal capacity well-outpacing that of the Ottoman Empire in the early modern period.
According to Stasavage (2020, p. 12), the Abbasid Empire was able to extract around 7%
of GDP in tax revenues in 850 CE, whereas centuries later England and France were only
about to extract about 1% of GDP (in 1300). However, by 1700, the leading economies
of Western Europe (England, the Dutch Republic, and France) were able to extract many
times more of per capita GDP than the Ottoman Empire (Karaman and Pamuk 2013). Our
model highlights one reason for this reversal of fortunes. In the early medieval period, prior
to the rise of European parliaments and the reduction in sovereign political power that came
with it, European states received little revenue from feudal tax collection, much of which
remained in the pockets of local feudal lords. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern states benefited
from religious legitimacy, which increased the tax base and thus the revenues taken in by the
central state. Indeed, religious authorities and institutions were employed to facilitate tax
collection in many cities, including Basra, in the Umayyad period, with mosques playing a
central role (although this role ultimately came under the purview of military and economic
elites) (Bessard 2020, pp. 205–06, 256). After the rise of European parliaments and the
reduction of clerical influence in politics, economic elites gained significant political power
(i.e., λ and β were low), in the process placing constraints on the power of the sovereign. In
this setting, there was much incentive for the elite (i.e., parliaments) to raise taxes because
those taxes were spent on their policy preferences. In other words, the benefits of limited
governance outweighed the benefits of religious legitimation with respect to tax revenue
collected by the state.

6

Conclusion

In this paper we provide an explanation for an important historical phenomenon: the Long
Divergence between Middle Eastern and Western European economies during the medieval
and early modern periods. We provide an explanation in terms of a model of institutional
and cultural change. In doing so, we unify prevailing theories based on religious legitimacy,
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religious proscriptions, and decentralization of political power. In the process, our model
resolves many puzzles left unaddressed in the literature.
In the context of the Long Divergence, the model centers on the power dynamics of
rulers, clerics, and secular elites in framing institutions in a religious environment. It
highlights three central historical features of these power dynamics: rulers derive legitimacy from the religious elites, religious authorities impose proscriptions that impinge on
economic development, and constraints on executive power have a fundamental role in
inducing economic growth. Most importantly, the model highlights how the institutions
resulting from the power dynamics of rulers, clerics, and secular elites interact with the
spread of culture (religious beliefs) in civil society. Limited governance interacts with religious legitimacy and religious proscriptions to determine its long-run economic and political
paths. Citizens remain religious or not in the face of religious proscriptions, depending on
the feedback between religious institutions and cultural evolution. The religious legitimacy
of the political system depends crucially on the prominence of religious values in society.
Our analysis concentrates on the role of religious proscriptions, legitimacy, and limited
governance as the main components of the Long Divergence between the Middle East and
the West. In the appendix, we show how our framework can also accommodate the role
of innovation and technological change as another key driver, interacting with religion and
religious legitimacy in the process of institutional and cultural divergence. In particular, we
discuss how our model is consistent with recent theories which argue that culture (Davids
2013, Mokyr 1990, 2010, 2016, White 1972, 1978), and religious proscriptions in particular
(Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni 2015, 2020, Coşgel, Miceli and Rubin 2012, Squicciarini
2020) can inhibit technological change.
More generally, our approach can be seen as an illustration of the explanatory power
of a class of models centered on some simple, general, and yet minimal components: i)
institutions as reflective of the relative political power of different groups in society to
affect policy decisions, ii) institutional change as a mechanism to internalize externalities
and other distortions characterizing the equilibrium, iii) the cultural profile of values and
preferences in society as evolving according to various socioeconomic incentives.49 In this
type of set-up, the interdependence between institutions and culture is a fundamental
factor, along with technology, driving socio-economic change and long term institutional
paths. We hope that this methodology is a stepping stone for further theoretical and
49

See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005a), Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2021), Bisin and Verdier
(2021), and Persson and Tabellini (2021) for surveys of this class of models.
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empirical analyses in economic history, projecting along those lines significant historical
processes of the evolution of power and social structures across groups and individuals.
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Appendices
A.1

Extension: Religious Legitimacy and Technological Progress

Although not highlighted in the central theories of the Long Divergence, nearly every theory of Britain’s (and eventually Europe’s) industrialization asks why Britain eventually
became technologically advanced beginning of the 18th century (Allen 2009, Mokyr 1990,
2010, 2016). While not all the advancements of the Industrial Revolution were science
based—especially inventions in textile production—many were, including the quintessential invention of the period, the steam engine. That Europe pulled ahead in science and
technology is puzzling: for centuries after the spread of Islam, the Middle East had a massive technological and scientific lead on Western Europe (Chaney 2016). What happened?
Why was there a reversal of scientific and technological fortunes between the two regions?
In this appendix, we consider an extended version of our framework to sketch and
discuss another potentially important driver of the Long Divergence between the Middle
East and the West, namely technological and scientific progress. As in the main text, we
first sketch the formal model and then discuss the historical stylized patterns. Proofs of
the propositions and mathematical derivations are provided afterwards.

A.1.1

A model of institutional and cultural divergence with technological progress

Again, we consider an extended version of the model where political power is divided
between religious clerics and the ruler. But now we study the conditions under which
the ruler allows an endogenous technological choice or adoption of a scientific innovation,
which is a source of productivity gains although it sometimes erodes religious beliefs.
More specifically, let the ruler and the clerics have political weights 1 − λ and λ respectively. Let also the parameter αI ∈ [0, αmax ] denote a variable characterizing the technology
level of the society. We assume that the level of technology is a policy instrument bounded
by the knowledge frontier αmax .
Given that our primary interest is to study the joint evolution of culture, institutions,
and technology, we consider again a reduced form model where the political power of the
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citizens is set to zero. The ruler now has utility
Ur = τ E − C(m);
and religious clerics have utility
Uc (m, αc ) = mαc − Ψ(αc ) − F (m).
We now consider religious legitimacy as a function of technology. Specifically, the
religious legitimacy of the ruler, θ(αI ) = θ0 − kαI , is a decreasing function of the level
of technology αI .50 In other words, adoption of innovative and sophisticated technologies
erodes traditional religious beliefs where the ruler is seen as legitimate. This can be inherent
to the process of innovative or scientific discoveries, which question the relationship between
people and the natural world (Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni 2020, Mokyr 1990, Squicciarini
2020).51 Finally, we assume that labor productivity is proportional to the technology level:
a = αI .
As in Section 5, citizens do not necessarily comply with tax collection and differ in their
(inverse) evasion capacity c. We fix now the taxation enforcement measure to ϵ0 < 1.
Equilibrium: At any time t, society reaches an equilibrium of the game between the ruler,
the clerics, and civil society. Following the same line of reasoning as in Section 3 in the
main text, the tax base of the economy is:
E = E(αI , αc , qt ) =

τ (1 − qt θ(αI ) · αc )
αI
}
{1 −
1 + ϕαc
ϵ0 c

The policy choices, that is the religious infrastructure m and the technology level αI are
collectively chosen so as to maximize social welfare:
W = (1 − λt )Ur (m, αI , αc , qt ) + λt Uc (m, αc );
50

(A.1)

To avoid some cumbersome taxonomy, we assume that kαmax < θ0 < 2kαmax . The first inequality ensures
that religious legitimacy can always be produced at any potential technological level. The second inequality ensures that maximum knowledge αmax is sufficiently large not to always constrain the equilibrium
technology choice by society.
51
Religious precepts are not always antithetical to scientific advancement. Indeed, White (1972, 1978) and
Davids (2013) argue that certain medieval European technologies were complementary to the Church’s
interest. For the sake of this extension, we focus on technologies that are antithetical to the interests of
religious authorities. Mokyr (1990) argues that this more often than not the case with new and disruptive
technologies.
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while the clerics choose αc . Solving the equilibrium:
αc = m, − C ′ (m) + λαc = 0,

(A.2)




ϵ0 c − τ (1 − qt θ0 αc )
αI (αc , qt ) = min
, αmax .
2τ qt kαc

(A.3)

The equilibrium choice of technology reflects the trade-off with respect to the tax base of
an increase in labor productivity and the erosion of religious legitimacy provided by the
clerics. It can also be seen that the optimal level of technology αI (αc , qt ) is decreasing in qt
and in αc . When the religious are more numerous and/or clerics undertake higher religious
efforts, the ruler is more reliant on religious legitimacy to raise revenues. Consequently, he
is also more reluctant to adopt innovative activities that may erode such legitimacy.
The solution to (A.2) and (A.3) provides the equilibrium values m (λt ), such that
C ′ (m) = λt m, αc (λt ) = m (λt ), and αI (λt , qt ) = αI (m (λ) , qt ).
Institutional Dynamics. We allow the ruler to delegate power to the clerics λ. Institutional change again internalizes the externality that is not taken into account by individual
decisions in equilibrium. As in the benchmark model, the provision of religious infrastructures m grants legitimacy to the ruler, reducing the subjectively perceived tax rate of
religious individuals, while at the same time depressing labor productivity because of increased religious proscriptions. As will be clear below, this interacts with the choice of the
optimal technology level adopted by society.
More specifically, given institutions λt , future institutions λt+1 are designed as the
solution to:
max(1 − λt ) [Ur (m(λt+1 ), αI (λt+1 ), αc (λt+1 ) , qt )] + λt Uc (m (λt+1 ) , αc (λt+1 )),
λt+1

(A.4)

with {m(λt+1 ), αc (λt+1 ), αI (λt+1 )} the equilibrium of period t + 1, as evaluated under the
institutional set-up λt . Solving this optimization problem, we deduce that:
Proposition 6 The optimization problem (A.4) admits a unique solution (λt+1 ) ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, there exists a threshold q I (λt ) such that
λt+1 > λt (resp. ≤) if qt > q I (λt ) (resp. ≤).
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The uniqueness result follows from the convexity of the optimization problem (A.4).
Whether the ruler delegates more power to clerics over time depends again on the fraction of
religious individuals qt . If the religious are sufficiently numerous, then religious legitimacy
matters relatively more than technology for the ruler’s tax base. Consequently, more
weight to the clerics λt+1 > λt is provided, as this increases their effort αc (λt+1 ). The ruler
consequently benefits from a larger tax base.
Cultural Dynamics. As in the main text, cultural dynamics are driven by inter-generational
transmission decisions from the citizens, and we have the following result:
Proposition 7 There exists a unique threshold qI∗ (λt ) such that
qt+1 < qt (resp. ≥) if qt > qI∗ (λt ) (resp. ≤).
Furthermore, the threshold qI∗ (λt ) is increasing in λt .
The cultural dynamics are still as in (11) and the threshold value qI∗ (λt ) is their unique
attractor. Hence, when the fraction of religious individuals qt is above (resp. below) qI∗ (λt ),
it tends to decrease (resp. increase).
Joint Dynamics. There are two steady states. In the religious regime equilibrium, the
ruler is legitimated by religion. The clerics have significant power (λ is high) and religious
beliefs are widespread (q is high). For both reasons, the technology level implemented in
society is low, as this threatens the religious legitimacy generated in this religious state.
Because, innovation adoption and scientific activity is limited, labor productivity is low, as
are fiscal revenues despite extractive taxation. The second steady state is a secular innovative regime where a high level of technology close to the knowledge frontier is adopted.
Clerics are weak, given that innovations limit their capacity to legitimate the ruler (λ is
zero) and the share of religious individuals is low (q is low). Fiscal revenues can be substantial, given that a process of scientific innovation leads to an overall increase in labor
productivity.
Complementarity. Again, a ruler’s option to rely on religious legitimacy induces a fundamental complementarity of the dynamics of culture and institutions. Along the path
towards a religious steady state, the ruler relies more on religious legitimacy to raise revenues. She also faces increasingly lower incentives to adopt efficient innovations that erode
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her legitimacy. The ruler then commits to an institutional set-up delegating an increasingly
large share of power to the clerics, reinforcing the incentive of religious individuals to pass
their values inter-generationally. In turn, this further decreases the incentive of the ruler
to adopt innovative technologies. Labor productivity stays low, given that technology is
limited. Finally, taxes are increasingly more extractive given that the population becomes
more religious but labor productivity remains low.
On the other hand, as a ruler relies less on religious legitimacy to raise revenues, she
also faces stronger incentives to adopt innovations that increase labor productivity and
consequently the fiscal base. As the ruler becomes more reliant on innovative activities to
raise revenues, her religious legitimacy erodes, so she faces less incentive to commit to an
institutional set-up where the religious clerics are powerful. Both the political weight of
the clerics and the value of passing religious values inter-generationally decrease. A lower
predominance of religious individuals further augments the political incentives to commit
and change the institutional set-up so as to adopt more efficient technologies, leading to
a substantial increase over time in labor productivity and fiscal revenues. Eventually,
the joint dynamics of culture and institutions converge to a secular regime where the
implemented technology is not constrained by political forces, but only by the existing
knowledge frontier.

A.1.2

The Historical Stylized Pattern

One of the great mysteries of the Long Divergence is the reversal of fortunes between
Middle Eastern and Western European science and technology. Data presented in Chaney
(2016) reveal that not only were scientific topics among the most ubiquitous in the corpus
of Islamic writings up through the 11th century, but up to that point the Islamic world
well out-paced Europe in scientific output. At some point in the 11th and 12th centuries,
however, a reversal of fortunes occurred. Islamic scientific production began to wane around
the 12th century. This was not simply a matter of the Islamic world falling behind relative
to Europe; it fell behind in absolute terms relative to what had once been. At the same
time, scientific works became much more prevalent in Western Europe. By the end of the
medieval period, Western Europe had a technological and scientific lead, and this would
only grow in subsequent centuries. Can this reversal of fortunes be explained by our model?
Our model, along with the history overviewed in Section 4, suggests that the reversal of technological and scientific fortunes was a consequences of a changing equilibrium
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in which Muslim religious authorities became increasingly important for legitimating the
state while European rulers sought alternative forms of legitimacy. In the Middle East,
the 11th century saw the rise of the madrasa system (Chaney 2016, Kuru 2019). This institutionalized the political role that had increasingly been played by religious authorities
since their consolidation under the Abbasids in the 9th and 10th centuries (Coşgel, Miceli
and Ahmed 2009, Rubin 2017). In this equilibrium, as we describe in Section A.1, religion
played an important role in legitimating rule (λ was large), society was largely religious (q
was large), and science and technology were impeded. As in Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni
(2020), technological stagnation mutually benefited religious authorities and the state: the
former lost power when alternative means of discovering truths or interpreting the world
were present, and the latter was harmed when one of its key sources of legitimacy was
undermined.
In the context of Middle Eastern history, this logic sheds light on both why madrasas
were allowed to thrive in spite of their negative effects on scientific production and why
rulers throughout the Muslim world banned one of the most important technologies of the
late medieval period: the printing press. Coşgel, Miceli and Rubin (2012) argues that the
Ottomans banned the press for over 240 years after first hearing of it precisely because it
threatened the religious establishment. By the 15th century, religious authorities across
the Islamic world (not just in the Ottoman Empire) had set up high barriers to entry.
The largest of these barriers was the years of training required to know various religious
texts and interpretations of those texts. These barriers raised the status of the religious
elite, further entrenching the “high-λ, high-q” equilibrium. The printing press threatened
to undermine these barriers and the equilibrium they helped uphold. Had printing become
widespread, a much larger share of the population would have had access to the great
religious and non-religious texts of the Islamic world (and beyond). This would have
undermined one of the very features that gave Muslim religious authorities the power to
legitimate in the first place. Hence, as our model predicts, heavy restrictions were placed
on this vastly important technology.
Muslim religious authorities had good reason to fear the spread of printing. They only
needed to look to Europe, where the press helped facilitate one of the great movements
against Church power in the history of Christianity: the Protestant Reformation (Boerner,
Rubin and Severgnini 2021, Dittmar and Seabold 2020, Rubin 2014). Unlike Ottoman
religious authorities, the Church was not able to stop the spread of the printing press. The
reason why this was the case follows from the logic of the model. As noted in Section 4.3,
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the Church had already lost much of its legitimating power in Europe prior to the spread of
printing. Alternative sources of legitimacy had emerged in the form of universities (which
provided a theoretical justification for monarchical rule) and parliaments (which brought
together elites who could legitimate rule in return for a seat at the political bargaining
table). By 1200 or so, religious authorities had lost their monopoly over the printed word
as well; book demand and supply was increasingly found in university towns and urban
centers (Buringh and Van Zanden 2009). As a result, there was little the Church could
have done to stop the spread of printing had it wanted to. By the mid-15th century,
Europe was in a “low-λ, low-q” equilibrium. Our model suggests that this should also
entail few restrictions on technology—at least those technologies that damage the capacity
of religious authorities to legitimate. The history of printing suggests that this was the
case.
The Christian world was hardly uniform in the degree to which religious legitimacy was
part of the broader political equilibrium. This was especially true after the Reformation,
which fundamentally undermined the role of religious authorities in the ruling coalition
(Rubin 2017). This had consequences for the spread of science and technology. Bénabou,
Ticchi and Vindigni (2020) summarize many of the scientific and technological advances
blocked or suppressed by the Church, including the works of Galileo, the Copernican Revolution, Newtonism, the Scientific Revolution, and technical education in schools. These
restrictions were much more widely applied in Catholic areas than Protestant ones. According to Mokyr (2016), it was the “culture of growth” supported by the Republic of Letters
that permitted the spread of the new, rational thinking of those like Bacon and Newton.
While the Republic of Letters was a pan-European phenomenon, there was little resistance
in the leading Protestant lands (England and the Dutch Republic). Meanwhile, even after
the first wave of industrialization, the Church attempted to limit secular education and
curriculum in schools (Squicciarini 2020).
In short, this extension helps explain both the technological and scientific reversal
of fortunes between Western Europe and the Middle East as well as the the divergence
within Europe. In Protestant Europe, new inventions and scientific ideas were allowed
to spread relatively unimpeded. This is what the model predicts would be the case in a
“low-λ, low-q” equilibrium. The equilibrium in Catholic Europe was one of higher λ and q,
and as a result some (though certainly not all) scientific and technological advances were
suppressed. In the “high-λ, high-q” equilibrium that pervaded most of the medieval and
early modern Middle East (at least, after the 11th century), scientific and technological
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advancements were even more restricted. Our model explains these outcomes not solely as
reflecting the desires of religious authorities, but also their place in their society’s broader
political-economy and cultural equilibria.

A.1.3

Proofs of Extension A.1

• Proof of Proposition 6
We consider that the policymaker chooses the amount of religious infrastructures m,
and level of technology αI ∈ [0, αmax ] to maximize
W (m, αI , αc , λ, q) = (1 − λ) [Ur (m, αI , q)] + λUc (m, αc )
while the cleric maximizes Uc (m, αc ) with respect to αc with
Ur (m, αI , q) = τ E(αI , αc , q) − C(m)
α2
Uc (αc , m) = mαc − c − C(m)
2
(we assume for convenience that the cost of the religious infrastructures C(m) is paid as a
lump-sum cost by all segments of society) with
E(αI , αc , q) =

αI
τ (1 − qt θαc )
{1 −
}
1 + ϕαc
ϵ0 c

where religious legitimacy is decreasing in the innovation effort: θ = θ(αI ) = θ0 − kαI . We
assume kαmax < θ0 < 2kαmax Given the institutional framework λ, one immediately gets
αc = m, − C ′ (m) + λαc = 0
and αI determined by the FOC:
"
αI (αc , q) = min

1−

τ (1−qθ0 αc )
ϵ0 c
, αmax
2τ qkαc
ϵ0 c

#

This gives the equilibrium values m (λ) , such that C ′ (m) = λm and αc (λ) = αc (λ) = m (λ)
and αI (λ, q) = αI (m (λ) , q). (We assume that C ′ (0) = 0 and C ′′ (m) > 1 to ensure the
existence of a unique equilibrium for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. This provides also αc (λ) = m (λ),
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As in the related proofs of Propositions 1 and 4, we first demonstrate that the optimization problem (A.4) admits a unique solution λt+1 ∈ [0, 1]:
max(1 − λt ) [Ur (m(λt+1 ), αI (λt+1 ), qt )] + λt Uc (m (λt+1 ) , αc (λt+1 )))

(A.5)

λt+1

In order to solve this maximization problem, we solve the following related optimization
problem:
f (m, αI , λt , qt ) = (1 − λt ) [Ur (m, αI , qt )] + λt Uc (m),
max W
(A.6)
m,αI

where the solution, denoted (m̃(λt , qt ), α
eI (λt , qt )) maximizes the social welfare when the
externalities are internalized, so given that Uc (m) = Uc (m, αc (m)) = 21 m2 − C(m), as
αc (m) = m. Ur (m, αI , qt ) = τ E(m, αI , qt ) − C(m), with
E(m, αI , qt ) =

αI
τ (1 − qt [θ0 − kαI ] m)
{1 −
}.
1 + ϕm
ϵ0 c

(A.7)

We also assume that in the previous optimization problem, the choices of both the religious provision m and of the effort of the innovators αI are made by a ruler who has
a policy commitment capacity, internalizing the externalities associated with the policy
choice problem described in the main text. We find that (m̃(λt , qt ), α
eI (λt , qt )) solves the
following equations:

h
h
f
−ϕ
αI
′
 ∂W
=
λ
m
−
C
(m)
+
(1
−
λ
)
t
t 1+ϕm 1+ϕm 1 −
∂m
h
i
f
τ (1−qt θm)
(1−λt )
 ∂W
− kαIϵτ0 cqt m } = 0.
= 1+ϕm {αI 1 −
∂αI
ϵ0 c

τ (1−q[[θ0 −kαI ]]m)
ϵ0 c

i

+

τ q[θ0 −kαI ]
ϵ0 c

i

= 0,

(A.8)
From the second FOC equation we again get the optimal level of technology:
"
αI (m, qt ) = min

1−

τ (1−qt θ0 m)
ϵ0 c
, αmax
2τ qt km
ϵ0 c

#

which rewrites as
ϵ0 c
τ

− 1 θ0
A
+
= αIop (m, qt ) when
≤m
2kqt m
2k
qt
A
= αmax when
≥m
qt

αI (m, qt ) =
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with
A=

ϵ0 c
τ

−1
>0
2kαmax − θ0

Note that αI (m, q) is decreasing in qt and m. Now the characterization of m̃(λt , qt ) is
obtained from
f
∂W
Θ (m) =
(m, αI (m, qt ) , λt , qt ) ≤ 0 and m ≥ 0
∂m
When C(m) is sufficiently convex, Θ (m) is decreasing in m. Moreover given that

Θ (0) = (1 − λt )αmax




τ
τ qt [θ0 − kαmax ]
−ϕ 1 −
+
ϵ0 c
ϵ0 c

we have Θ (0) > 0 when


ϕ
ϵ0 c
−1
qt > q =
[θ0 − kαmax ] τ
Thus m̃(λt , qt ) = 0 for qt ≤ q and m̃(λt , qt ) > 0 for qt > q. Substitution provides α
eI (λt , qt ) =
αI (m̃(λt , qt ), qt ).
Moreover as




f
αI
−ϕ
τ [[θ0 − kαI ]] m
τ [θ0 − kαI ]
∂ 2W
= (1 − λt )
+
∂m∂q
1 + ϕm 1 + ϕm
ϵ0 c
ϵ0 c
αI
τ [θ0 − kαI ]
>0
= (1 − λt )
2
ϵ0 c
[1 + ϕm]
Then m̃(λt , qt ) is increasing in qt . As well m̃(λt , qt ) ≥ m (λt ) if and only if
−ϕ
1+ϕm(λt )

or

h

τ (1−qt [[θ0 −kαI (m(λt ),qt )]]m)
ϵ0 c
τ qt [θ0 −kαI (m(λt ),qt )]
+
ϵ0 c

1−

i
≥0




ϵ0 c
ϕ
− 1 ≤ qt [θ0 − kαI (m (λt ) , qt )]
τ

(A.9)

qt [θ0 − kαI (m (λt ) , qt )] is an increasing function of qt and decreasing function of λt . Condition (A.9) can be rewritten as a threshold condition qt ≥ q I (λt ) for q I (λt ) ∈ (0, 1] with
q I (λt ) is a decreasing function of λt .
Summarizing we get m̃(λt , qt ) ≥ m (λt ) if and only if qt ≥ q I (λt ) for q I (λt ) ∈ (0, 1] .
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Since (m̃(λt , qt ), α˜I (λt , qt )) maximizes the social welfare when the externalities are internalized, λt+1 solves the optimization problem (A.4) when:

m̃(λ , q ) = m(λ
t

t+1 ),

t

and

(A.10)

α̃ (λ , q ) = α (m(λ ), q )
I
t t
I
t+1
t
Given the first equality, it is immediate to see that the second equality is automatically
satisfied from the definition of αI (m, qt ) . Given this the institutional dynamics of λt is
uniquely determined. Observe as well that m̃(λt , qt ) ≥ m (λt ) if and only if qt ≥ q I (λt ).
This can be rewritten as m(λt+1 ) ≥ m (λt ) if and only if qt ≥ q I (λt ). Given the fact that
m (λ) is increasing in λ, we deduce the following result:
λt+1 ≥ λt if and only if qt ≥ q I (λt )
This concludes the proof of Proposition 6.
• Proof of Proposition 7
The paternalistic motives have to be amended to take into account the fact that productivity is optimally determined by the endogenous choice of technology: More precisely
we have:

V

ReRe (λ, q)

=

Re S (λ, q)

=

V

R τ /ϵ (1−cϵ0 ) dc
(1−τRe )αI (λ,q) R c
dc
+ 0 Re 0 1+ϕα
1+ϕαc (λ)
τRe /ϵ0 c
c (λ) c
R τ /ϵ0 (1−cϵ0 ) dc
(1−τRe )αI (λ,q) R c
dc
+ 0
,
(1+ϕαc (λ))
1+ϕαc (λ) c
τ /ϵ0 c

(A.11)

Hence,
∆VRe (λ, β, q) =

(τ θαc (λ))2 αI (λ, q)
.
2cϵ0 (1 + ϕαc (λ))

(A.12)

Similarly, we find that
∆VS (λ, β, q) = ∆VRe (λ, β, q) = ∆V (λ, β, q) =

(τ θαc (λ))2 αI (λ, q)
.
2cϵ0 (1 + ϕαc (λ))

(A.13)

Again the result that ∆Vs (λ, β, q) = ∆Vre (λ, β, q) follows from the quadratic specification
of the expected payoff functions. Note as well that because αI (λ, q)) depends on q (ie. is
a decreasing function in q), ∆V (λ, β, q) also depends on q and is decreasing function of q
Now, the cultural dynamics write as
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qt+1 − qt = qt (1 − qt )D(λt , qt ).

(A.14)

with
D(λt , qt ) = d∗Re − d∗S = DRe [(1 − qt )∆V (λt , qt ), m(λt )] − DS [qt ∆V (λt , qt )]
can be interpreted as the relative ”cultural fitness” of the religious trait in the population.
Again simple inspection shows
D(λt , 0) = DRe [∆V (λt , 0), m(λt )] > 0
and
D(λt , 1) = −DS [∆V (λt , 1)] < 0
From this it follows that there exists a threshold qI∗ (λt ) ∈ (0, 1) such that
D(λt , qI∗ (λt )) = 0

(A.15)

Compared to the benchmark model, D(λt , qt ) may not be always decreasing function in qt ,
as ∆V (λt , qt ) is decreasing in qt and the uniqueness of the threshold qd∗ (λt ) is not necessarily
ensured. When however q∆V (λ, q) is increasing function of q,52 simple inspection shows
that D(λt , qt ) is a decreasing function of qt and that qt+1 < qt if and only if qt > qI∗ (λt , βt ),
as stated in proposition 7. QED.

52

This is ensured when 1 >

τ2
cϵ0

max





θ
ϕ, 1
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A.2

Proofs of Lemmas 1, 2 and 3

In order to prove the three Lemmas of the main text, we solve the equilibrium, where the
amount of religious infrastructures m is determined by the institutional system so as to
maximize the social welfare W ,
1
λ
1−λ
W = UR (m) + Uc (m, αc ) +
[qURe (eRe ) + (1 − q)US (eS )] .
2
2
2

(A.16)

while the ruler, the clerics and the individuals choose, respectively, τ, αc and ei , i =
Re, S to maximize their utility (taking as given what the other segments of society do,
as well as the policy variable m). The Nash equilibrium of this policy game is denoted
{τ (λ), m(λ), αc (λ), eS (λ), eRe (λ)}. It is clear that τ (λ) is equal to τ ≡ τ and the remaining
first-order conditions are:



−C ′ (m) − λF ′ (m) + λ · αc = 0




m − Ψ′ (α ) = 0
c
(A.17)


(1 − τRe ) − (1 + ϕαc )eRe = 0




(1 − τ ) − (1 + ϕα )e = 0,
c

or after substitution:

S




C ′ (m) + λF ′ (m) = λαc




Ψ′ (α ) = m
c
+τ θαc


eRe = 1−τ

1+ϕαc



e = 1−τ
S
1+ϕαc

(A.18)

Assuming that the marginal cost functions C ′ (.), F ′ (.) and Ψ′ (.) are increasing convex
functions (ie. C ′′′ (.) ≥ 0, F ′′′ (.) ≥ 0 and Ψ′′′ (.) ≥ 0) with at least one of these cost
derivatives strictly convex), and the limit condition limx→∞ F ′′ (x) > 1, and F ′′ (0)Ψ′′ (0) <
1, then the first two equations of (A.18) simply characterize a unique equilibrium couple
C ′′ (0)Ψ′′ (0)
m(λ) > 0 and αc (λ) > 0 when 1−F
′′ (0)Ψ′′ (0) < λ, while m(λ) = αc (λ) = 0 for λ ≤
C ′′ (0)Ψ′′ (0)
.
1−F ′′ (0)Ψ′′ (0)

Lemma 1: Differentiating the previous first-order conditions, it is easy to note that
the optimal provision of religious infrastructure m(λ) > 0 and the effort of the clerics
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αc (λ) > 0 are both increasing in λ and independent from θ and ϕ. This concludes the
proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2: The equilibrium production efforts are obtained as

e (λ) =
Re
e (λ) =
S

1−τ +τ θαc (λ)
1+ϕαc (λ)

1−τ
1+ϕαc (λ)

(A.19)

The equilibrium secular effort e∗S (λ) is decreasing in clerics activities αc∗ and thus, it is
decreasing in λ. It is independent from ϕ and θ
Additionally, from the equation above, eRe (λ) increases with θ and decreases with ϕ.
The effect of αc (λ) on eRe (β, λ) is ambiguous. By deriving eRe (λ) with respect to αc , we
ϕ, then eRe (λ) increases with αc (λ), in which case eRe (λ) increases
find that when θ > 1−τ
τ
with λ. This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3: The equilibrium tax base of the ruler writes as
E(λ) = q · eRe (λ) + (1 − q) · es (λ),
so
E(λ) =

1 − τ + τ θq · αc (λ)
.
1 + ϕαc (λ)

(A.20)

(A.21)

By deriving the previous expression with respect to αc (λ), we find that the tax base is
ϕ. Hence, when the previous condition
increasing in the clerics’ effort if and only if q ≥ 1−τ
τθ
is satisfied, E(λ) is increasing in λ. Finally, from (A.21), E(λ) is increasing in q and θ,
and decreasing in ϕ. This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.

A.3

Proof of Proposition 1

- First, we demonstrate that the optimization problem (7) rewritten below admits a unique
solution λt+1 ∈ [0, 1]:
max
λt+1

1
λt
Ur (m(λt+1 )) + Uc (m(λt+1 ), αc (λt+1 ))+
2
2
1 − λt
[qt Ure (eRe (λt+1 )) + (1 − qt )Us (es (λt+1 ))] . (A.22)
2
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In order to solve this maximization problem, we consider the following related optimization problem:
h
i
1
ec (m) + (1 − λt ) qt U
ere (m) + (1 − qt )U
es (m) },
max W (m, qt ) = {Ur (m) + λt U
m
2
with


′


α
ec (m) = ψ −1 (m)




+τ θq α
ec (m)


E(m) = 1−τ1+ϕe

αc (m)



U (m) = τ E(m) − C(m)
r

ec (m) = α

U
ec (m)m − ψ(e
αc (m)) − F (m)



2


eRe (m) = [1−τ +τ θαec (m)]

U

2(1+ϕe
αc (m))


2

U
e (m) = (1−τ ) .
S

(A.23)

(A.24)

2(1+ϕe
αc (m))

In the optimization problem (A.23), the choice of the religious infrastructure m is made by a
ruler able to commit to the provision of m, and therefore internalizing the two externalities
detailed in the main text. We find that:
2

∂W
e ′ (m)+(1−qt )U
e ′ (m)]. (A.25)
= λt [e
αc (m) − F ′ (m)]−C ′ (m)+τ E ′ (m)+(1−λt )[qt U
Re
S
∂m

When C(.) and F (.) are sufficiently convex, the function W is concave in m, and the
previous optimization admits a unique solution m̃(λt , qt ) ≥ 0.
ei (m(λ)) for i = {Re, S}, and Uc (m(λ), αc (λ)) =
Note that αc (λ) = α
ec (m(λ)), Ui (ei (λ)) = U
ec (m(λ)). Given that m̃(λt , qt ) maximizes the social welfare when the externalities are inU
ternalized, the solution λt+1 of the optimization problem (7), should be such as to induce
an equilibrium choice m (λt+1 ) as close to m̃(λt , qt ) as possible:

λt+1




λ s.t m(λ) = m̃(λt , qt )


= 1



0

if m̃(λt , qt ) ∈ (m(0), m(1))
if m̃(λt , qt ) > m(1)

(A.26)

if m̃(λt , qt ) < m(0).

When the clerics have power λt+1 given by (A.26), institutions are designed for t + 1 so
as to induce a choice m(λt+1 ) in that period that maximizes the social welfare of period
t. Given that m(λ) is increasing in λ,this solution λt+1 of problem (7) is unique and the
institutional dynamics are well defined.
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Note that

∂ m̃
∂q

2

2

∂ W ∂ W
= − ∂m∂q
/ ∂m2 and has the sign of

2
and

∂2W
∂m∂q

(as W is concave in m). As

∂ 2W
′
eS′ (m)]
eRe
(m) − U
= (1 − λt )[U
∂m∂q

αc (m) [2(1 − τ ) + τ θe
αc (m)]
eRe (m) − U
eS (m) = τ θe
U
2(1 + ϕe
αc (m))

e ′ (m)−
is an increasing of α
ec (m) and therefore an increasing function of m. It follows that U
Re
2
e ′ (m) > 0 and ∂ W > 0, from which we conclude that m̃(λt , qt ) is increasing in qt .
U
S

∂m∂q

- In the second step of the proof, we demonstrate that there exists a threshold q(λt )
such that if qt > q, then λt+1 > λt . Otherwise, λt+1 ≤ λt .
In order to demonstrate this claim, we first show the following intermediary result:
Lemma 6 λt+1 > λt if and only if m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt ).
Proof: Indeed, m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt ) means that if the ruler had the capacity to commit,
in period t, to provide religious infrastructures m, then he would chooses a level m̃(λt , qt )
strictly above what he actually provides in equilibrium. Since m(.) is an increasing function
(Lemma 1), we deduce that λt+1 is such that λt+1 > λt .53 QED.
Lemma 7 m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt ) if and only if qt > q(λt ), with:


ϕ (1 − τ ) τ + (1 − λt ) 1−τ
1
2


q (λt ) =
τ θ τ + (1 − λt ) 1 − τ + τ θαc∗ (λt ) 1 + ϕ2 αc∗ (λt )

(A.27)

Proof: From the proof of Lemma 1 above, the first-order condition associated with
the determination of m(λ) is:
λt [e
αc (m) − F ′ (m)] − C ′ (m) = 0,

(A.28)

′

given that α
ec (m) = ψ −1 (m).
The first order condition for the determination of m̃(λt , qt ) writes as

dW
dm

= 0, with

i
dW
1h
′
′
′
′
′
e
e
=
λt [e
αc (m) − F (m)] − C (m) + τ E (m) + (1 − λt )[qt URe (m) + (1 − qt )US (m)] .
dm
2
(A.29)
53

When an interior solution exists, λt+1 solves m̃(λt ) = m(λt+1 ). Hence, if m̃(λt ) > m(λt ) then λt+1 > λt .
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Consider the expression
′
eS′ (m)]}.
eRe
(m) + (1 − qt )U
H(m) = τ · E ′ (m) + (1 − λ)[qt U

Given the two FOCs above, we deduce that m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt ) if and only if H(m(λt )) >
0. We show that condition H(m(λt )) > 0 is equivalent to a condition over the possible
values of q.

deRe
deS
+ (1 − qt ) ·
dm
dm
qt τ θ − (1 − τ )ϕ de
αc (m))
=
,
dm
[1 + ϕe
αc (m)]2

E ′ (m) = qt ·

′
URe
(m)



eRe (m) de
αc (m)
= eRe (m) θτ − ϕ ·
2
dm


1 − τ + τ θe
αc (m)
1 1 − τ + τ θe
αc (m) de
αc (m)
=
θτ − ϕ ·
1 + ϕe
αc (m)
2 1 + ϕe
αc (m)
dm

(A.30)
(A.31)

(A.32)
(A.33)

and
ϕ (eS (m))2 de
αc (m)
2
dm

2
1
de
αc (m)
1−τ
= −ϕ ·
·
2 1 + ϕe
αc (m)
dm

Us′ (m) = −

Thus,
2

dW
= λe
αc (m) − C ′ (m) − λF ′ (m) + H(m),
dm

with
[1 + ϕe
αc (m)]2

H(m)
de
αc (m)
dm

= τ · (qt τ θ − (1 − τ )ϕ) + (1 − λ)G(m)
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(A.34)
(A.35)

and



ϕ
G(m) = qt (1 − τ + τ θe
αc (m)) θτ (1 + ϕe
αc (m)) − (1 − τ + τ θe
αc (m))
2
ϕ
−(1 − qt ) [1 − τ ]2
2



ϕ
ϕ
= qt τ θ (1 − τ ) + τ θe
αc (m) 1 + α
ec (m) − [1 − τ ]2
2
2
Then the condition H(m(λt )) > 0 writes as
"
τ · (qt τ θ − (1 − τ )ϕ) + (1 − λ)


 #
qt τ θ (1 − τ ) + τ θe
αc (m) 1 + ϕ2 α
ec (m)
≥0
− ϕ2 [1 − τ ]2

or using αc (λ) = α
ec (m(λ)) = Ψ′−1 (m(λ)) and rearranging terms H(m(λt )) > 0 if and only
if qt > q(λt ) with


ϕ (1 − τ ) τ + (1 − λ) 1−τ
1
2
,

q (λ) =
τ θ τ + (1 − λ) 1 − τ + τ θαc (λ) 1 + ϕ2 αc (λ)

(A.36)

and αc (λ) is an increasing function of λ. We conclude that m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt ) if and only
if qt > q(λt ).QED.
Combining the results established in Lemmas 6 and 7, it follows that λt+1 > λt if and
only if q > q(λt ).
Finally, from (A.36), we deduce that q(λt ) is decreasing in θ and ϕ. This concludes the
proof of the first point of Proposition 1.

A.4

Proof of Proposition 2

As mentioned in the main text, cultural dynamics are modeled as purposeful inter-generational
transmission (Bisin and Verdier (2001), Bisin and Verdier (2017)), through parental socialization and imitation of society at large. Direct vertical socialization to the parent’s trait
i ∈ {Re, S} occurs with probability di . If a child from a family with trait i is not directly
socialized, which occurs with probability 1 − di , he/she is horizontally/obliquely socialized
by picking the trait of a role model chosen randomly in the population. The probability
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Pij that a child in group i is socialized to trait j writes as:

P = d + (1 − d )q
ii
i
i i
P = (1 − d )q
ij
i j

(A.37)

with qRe = qt and qS = 1 − qt . Let Vij (λt ) = Ui (ej (λt )) denote the utility to a cultural
trait i parent of a type j child, with i, j ∈ {Re, S}. We denote the paternalistic bias
of a parent of type i as ∆Vi (λt ) = Vii (λt ) − Vij (λt ), for j ̸= i. The socialization cost
hRe (dRe , m) of a parent of type Re (respectively S) is assumed to be a smooth function
2
Re ,m)
with ∂hRe∂d(dRe
≥ 0; ∂ hRe∂d(d2 Re ,m) > 0 (ie. hRe (dRe , m) is increasing convex in dRe ) and
Re

(d,m)
(0,m)
the Inada conditions hRe (0, m) = ∂hRe
= 0, limd→1 hRe (d, m) = limd→1 ∂hRe
= +∞
∂dRe
∂dRe
′
′′
Similarly, the socialization cost hS (dS ) of a parent of type S satifies hS (dS ) ≥ 0; hS (dS ) > 0
(ie. hS (dS ) is increasing convex in dS (ie. ), and hS (0) = h′S (0) = 0, limd→1 hS (d) =
limd→1 h′S (d) = +∞.
Furthermore, to reflect the fact religious infrastructures may enter as a complementary
(dRe ,m)
input to parental effort for transmission of the religious trait, we assume that ∂hRe∂m
≤0
2
∂ hRe (dRe ,m)
and ∂dRe ∂m ≤ 0, (ie. m affects negatively the cost and the marginal cost of socialization
of religious parents). Following Bisin and Verdier (2001), direct socialization d∗Re of religious
parents is the solution to the following socialization problem:

max −hRe (dRe , mt ) + PReRe · VReRe (λt ) + PReS · VRe S (λt ),
dRe

(A.38)

while direct socialization d∗S of secular parents is the solution to the following socialization
problem:
max −hS (dS ) + PSS · VSS (λt ) + PSRe · VSRe (λt ),
(A.39)
dS

The FOCs of the previous programs determine the optimal socialization efforts as:
∂hRe (d∗Re , mt )
= (1 − qt )∆VRe (λt ) and h′S (d∗S ) = qt ∆Vs (λt )
∂dRe
which can be rewritten as d∗Re (qt , λt ) = DRe ((1 − qt )∆VRe (λt ), m(λt )) and d∗S (qt , λt ) =
DS (qt ∆VS (λt )).
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Note that by the Inada conditions on hRe (·, ·), d∗Re ∈ [0, 1] , and DRe (0, m) = 0. As well
DRe (·, ·) is an increasing function of both arguments (1 − qt )∆VRe (λt ) and m, as we have:
∂d∗Re
=
∂(1 − qt )∆VRe (λt ))

1
∂ 2 hRe
∂d2Re

∂2h

Re
∂d∗Re
∂dRe ∂m
> 0 and
= − ∂2h
>0
Re
∂mt
∂d2
Re

Similarly the Inada conditions on hS (·) ensure that d∗S ∈ [0, 1] , DS (0) = 0. As well
d∗S = DS (qt ∆VS (λt )) is an increasing function of qt ∆VS (λt ) as
∂d∗S
1
= ′′ > 0
∂(qt ∆VS (λt ))
hS
Using the Law of Large Numbers, one easily obtains the intergenerational evolution of
the frequency of the religious trait qt in the population as
qt+1 = qt · PReRe + (1 − qt ) · PSRe
or after substitution of (A.37) and the values of d∗Re and d∗S ,
qt+1 − qt = qt (1 − qt ){d∗Re (qt , λt ) − d∗S (qt , λt )}.

(A.40)

As mentioned in the main text, in equation (A.40), the term
D(qt , λt ) = d∗Re (qt , λt ) − d∗S (qt , λt )
= DRe [(1 − qt )∆VRe (λt ), m(λt )] − DS [qt ∆VS (λt )]
can be interpreted as the relative ”cultural fitness” of the religious trait in the population. This term is frequency dependent (ie. depends on the state of the population
qt ). Moreover simple inspection shows that D(qt , λt ) is a decreasing function of qt , with
D(0, λt ) = DRe [∆VRe (λt ), m(λt )] > 0 and D(1, λt ) = −DS [∆VS (λt )] < 0. From this it
follows that there exists a unique threshold q ∗ (λt ) ∈ (0, 1) such that
D(q ∗ (λt ), λt ) = 0

(A.41)

Inspection of equation (A.40) and the fact that D(qt , λt ) is a decreasing function of qt
provides immediately that qt+1 < qt if and only if qt > q ∗ (λt ), proving therefore proposition
in the main text. QED.
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A.5

Comparative statics on the cultural threshold q ∗(λt)

The relative ”cultural fitness” of the religious trait D(qt , λt ) is affected by the institutional
environment λt , as this variable interacts with the process of parental cultural transmission
both through paternalistic motivations ∆Vi (λt ), and through the provision of religious
infrastructures mt = m(λt ) as a complementary input to religious family socialization.
Therefore the dependence of the threshold q ∗ (λt ) on the institutional environment λt and
the comparative statics on the parameters θ and ϕ depends on how the relative ”cultural
fitness” D(qt , λt ) of the religious trait is affected by changes in such features.
It is first useful to note that with the quadratic specification for the utility functions
Ui (.) of workers, the paternalistic motives .∆VRe (λt ) and ∆VS (λt ) are equal and take a
simple form. Indeed we have:

V

ReRe (λ)

=

(1−τRe )2
2(1+ϕαc (λ))

(1−τ )2
1−τ
1
V
Re S (λ) = (1 − τRe ) 1+ϕαc (λ) − 2 (1 + ϕαc (λ)) (1+ϕαc (λ))2 .

(A.42)

Hence,
∆VRe (λ) = VReRe (λ) − VRe S (λ) =

(τ θαc (λ))2
.
2(1 + ϕαc (λ))

(A.43)

Similarly, we find that

V (λ) = (1−τ )2
SS
2(1+ϕαc (λ))
V (λ) = (1 − τ ) 1−τRe − 1 (1 + ϕα (λ)) (1−τRe )2 .
c
SRe
1+ϕαc (λ)
2
(1+ϕαc (λ))2
and
∆VS (λ) = VSS (λ) − VSRe (λ) =

(τ θαc (λ))2
2(1 + ϕαc (λ))

(A.44)

2

(τ θαc (λ))
Thus posing ∆V (λ) = 2(1+ϕα
, we get ∆VRe (λ) = ∆VS (λ) = ∆V (λ) and the relative
c (λ))
”cultural fitness” of the religious trait D(qt , λt ) rewrites as:

D(qt , λt ) = DRe [(1 − qt )∆V (λt ), m(λt )] − DS [qt ∆V (λt )]
Now, considering the functions DRe (x, y) and DS (z) that respectively characterize the
optimal socialization behavior of religious parents as
d∗Re (qt , λt ) = DRe [(1 − qt )∆V (λt ), m(λt )] , and d∗S (qt , λt ) = DS (qt ∆VS (λt ))
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define the sensitivity of parents’ socialization to paternalistic motives by the following
elasticities:
∂DRe (x, y)
x
∂DS
z
ϵRe (q, λ) =
·
and ϵS (q, λ) =
·
∂x
DRe
∂z DRe
evaluated respectively at x = (1 − q)∆V (λ) and y = m(λ), and z = q∆VS (λ).
Differentiation of (A.41) then provides with d∗ (λt ) = d∗Re (q ∗ (λt ), λt ) = d∗S (q ∗ (λt ), λt )
∗′

q (λt ) =

[ϵRe (q ∗ , λt ) − ϵS (q ∗ , λt )] d∗ (λt ) ·

∆V ′ (λt )
∆V (λt )

+

∂DRe
∂m

· m′ (λt )

(q ∗ (λt ), λt )
− ∂D
∂q
∗

(A.45)

Given that ∂D
(q ∗ (λt ), λt ) < 0, ∂q
has the sign of the numerator. This numerator is com∂q
∂λt
posed of two terms reflecting the two channels through which the institutional environment
λt affects cultural transmission. The first term K(λt ) = [ϵRe (q ∗ , λt ) − ϵS (q ∗ , λt )] d∗ (λt ) ·
∆V ′ (λt )
is the paternalistic motive channel. As ∆V ′ (λt ) > 0, both types of parents in∆V (λt )
crease the intensity of socialization to their own traits. The sign of K(λt ) depends on the
relative sensitivity of parents’ socialization to paternalistic motives. It is positive when
ϵRe (q ∗ , λt ) > ϵS (q ∗ , λt ), namely when the socialization rate of religious parents d∗Re is more
sensitive to paternalistic motives than the one of secular parents d∗S .
Re
· m′ (λt ) is positive. It reflects the fact that by promoting reliThe second term ∂D
∂m
gious infrastructures that enter as complementary inputs in the socialization process of the
religious trait, an increase in the clerics weight λt makes the religious trait to be relatively
more successfully transmitted than the secular trait.
From this discussion it follows that when religious parents’ socialization efforts are more
sensitive to paternalistic motives than secular parents (ie. ϵRe (q, λt ) > ϵS (q, λt )) , and (or)
when religious infrastructures are strong enough complementary inputs to socialization to
the religious trait, then the numerator of (A.87) is positive and q ∗ (λt ) is increasing in λt .
As can be seen from (A.43) and (A.44), a change in the other parameters θ (the efficiency of the clerics) and ϕ (the restrictiveness of religious proscriptions) affects the relative
cultural fitness of the religious trait only through their induced changes on the paternalistic
motive ∆V (λt ), with ∆V (λ) increasing in θ,and decreasing ϕ. It follows that
K(λt ) · ∂∆V∂ϕ(λt )
K(λt ) · ∂∆V∂θ(λt )
∂q ∗ (λt )
∂q ∗ (λt )
= ∂D ∗
and
= ∂D ∗
∂θ
∂θ
− ∂q (q (λt ), λt )
− ∂q (q (λt ), λt )
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When religious parents are more sensitive to paternalistic motives than secular parents,
one has K(λt ) > 0 and a positive shift in θ (negative shift of ϕ) leads to a higher value of
q ∗ (λt ). This provides the comparative statics discussion on q ∗ (λt ) in the main text. QED.
• Example with constant elasticity socialization cost functions:
Consider the following socialization cost functions:

h (d) = d1+ηre ·
Re
1+ηre
1+η
h (d) = d s ,
s

1
mγ

and

(A.46)

1+ηs

with ηs ≥ ηre > 0 and γ > 0. The optimal socialization efforts are such that:

γ
1
d∗ (q , λ ) = ((1 − q )∆V (λ )) ηre
ηre
·
m
(λ
)
t
t
t
t
t
Re
d∗ (q , λ ) = (q ∆V (λ )) η1s .
S

t

t

t

(A.47)

t

and in this constant elasticity specification ϵRe (q, λ) − ϵS (q, λ) =
the cultural dynamics equation (11), we deduce that:

1
ηre

γ

1

−

1
ηs

1

≥ 0. Rewriting

qt+1 − qt = qt (1 − qt ){((1 − qt )∆V (λt )) ηre · m (λt ) ηre − (qt ∆V (λt )) ηs },

(A.48)

which admits two unstable steady states q = 0 and q = 1, and a unique interior attractor,
which we denote q ∗ (λt ) such that:
1

q ∗ (λt ) ηs
(1 − q ∗ (λt ))

1
ηre

= ∆V (λt )

ηS −ηre
ηS ηre

γ

· m (λt ) ηre

(A.49)

given that ηS ≥ ηre , we deduce that q ∗ (λt ) is increasing in θ, λt , and decreasing in ϕ.

A.6

Existence and Stability Analysis of interior steady
states

Let Γ, The set of interior steady states of the joint dynamics of culture and institutions:

Γ = (λ, q) ∈ (0, 1)2 | q = q (λ) and q = q ∗ (λ)
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namely the set of interior intersection points of the institutional and cultural manifolds
q = q (λ) and q = q ∗ (λ).
• When q(1) < q ∗ (1), the set Γ is not empty.
Proof: First note that q ∗ (0) = 0. Indeed the thresholds q ∗ (λ) is the solution of (A.48):
D(q, λ) = d∗Re (q, λ) − d∗S (q, λ) = 0
Now given that religious infrastructures m are an essential input in the socialization of
religious individuals and that m(0) = 0,
d∗Re (q, 0) = DRe [(1 − q)∆VRe (0), m(0)] = DRe [(1 − q)∆VRe (0), 0] = 0
while d∗S (0, λ) = DS [0] = 0, Thus D(0, 0) = 0 and therefore q ∗ (0) = 0.
The thresholds q (λ) is characterized by (A.36):
q (λ) =

Hence q (0) =

ϕ(1−τ 2 )
2τ θ

τ + (1 − λ) 1−τ
ϕ (1 − τ )
2


τθ
τ + (1 − λ) 1 − τ + τ θαc (λ) 1 + ϕ2 αc (λ)
∈ (0, 1) under assumption 1. As well differentiation of q (λ) provides





ϕ (1 − τ )
1−τ
1+τ
′
q (0) =
−
−
· (− [1 − τ ] + τ θ · αc (0))
τθ
2
2
ϕ (1 − τ ) τ
=
{(1 − τ ) − (1 + τ ) θ · αc′ (0)}
2τ θ
′

the function Λ(λ) = q ∗ (λ) − q (λ) is continuous and such that Λ(0) = −q (0) < 0, and
Λ(1) = q ∗ (1) − q (1) > 0. Thus there is a λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that Λ(λ∗ ) = 0 and given that
q ∗ = q ∗ (λ∗ ) < 1, the point (λ∗ , q ∗ ) ∈ Γ and the set Γ is non empty.QED
• Condition for q(1) < q ∗ (1)
)
Note that q (1) = ϕ(1−τ
>
τθ
equivalent to D(q(1), 1) > 0, or

ϕ(1−τ 2 )
2τ θ

= q (0). Moreover the condition q(1) < q ∗ (1) is

DRe [(1 − q(1))∆V (1), m(1)] > DS [q(1)∆V (1)]
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2

(τ θαc (1))
. We know that when religious parents are more sensitive to
with ∆V (1) = 2(1+ϕα
c (1))
paternalistic motives than secular parents, q ∗ (λt ) is increasing in θ and decreasing in ϕ.
This hold in particular for q ∗ (1). Given that q (1) is a decreasing function of θ and an
increasing function of ϕ, it follows that the condition q(1) < q ∗ (1) is more likely to be
satisfied when θ is large enough and ϕ small enough. In the parametrization with constant
elasticity socialization cost functions, the condition for q(1) < q ∗ (1) writes as:
1

(τ θαc (1))2
<
2(1 + ϕαc (1))


q(1) ηs
(1 − q(1))

1
ηre

re
 ηηS −η
η
S re

γ

· m (1) ηre

which will hold when m (1) is large enough.
• Saddle node steady state in the joint dynamics of culture and institutions:
- Let denote the interior steady state (λ∗E , qE∗ ) ∈ Γ such that λ∗E = min {λ ∈ (0, 1) | q (λ) = q ∗ (λ)}
and qE∗ = q (λE ) = q ∗ (λE ). (λ∗E , qE∗ ) is the ”lowest” interior steady state of the system. It
is clear that because of the smoothness of the function Λ(λ) = q ∗ (λ) − q (λ), one should
have Λ′ (λ∗E ) > 0 or q ∗′ (λ∗E ) > q ′ (λ∗E ).
Consider now the local dynamics around the interior steady state (λ∗E , qE∗ ). Inside the
interior of [0, 1]2 , the joint dynamics of institutions and culture write as
λt+1 − λt = m−1 [m̃(λt , qt )] − λt
qt+1 − qt = qt (1 − qt )D(qt , λt )}.
At the continous time limit, this provides the differential equations system :
·

λ = m−1 [m̃(λ, q)] − λ

(A.50)

·

q = q(1 − q)D(q, λ)}.
Note first that the threshold q = q (λ) is obtained from the relationship m̃(λ, q) = m(λ),
while the threshold q ∗ (λ) is obtained from the relationship D(q, λ) = 0. From this we
obtain that the slopes of the manifolds:
q ′ (λ∗E ) =

m′ (λ∗E ) − m̃′λ (λ∗E , qE∗ )
Dλ (qE∗ , λ∗E )
∗′
and
q
(λ
)
=
E
m̃′q (λ∗E , qE∗ )
−Dq (qE∗ , λ∗E )
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Now the jacobian matrix of the system (A.50) at the steady state (λ∗E , qE∗ ) is given by
J=

∗)
m̃λ (λ∗E ,qE
−1
∗
′
m (λE )
qE∗ (1 − qE∗ )Dλ (qE∗ , λ∗E )

qE∗ (1

∗)
m̃q (λ∗E ,qE
∗
′
m (λE )
− qE∗ )Dq (qE∗ , λ∗E )

!

Given that m′ (λ∗E ) > 0, the sign of the determinant ∆ of that jacobian is the same as
the sign of
[m̃λ (λ∗E , qE∗ ) − m′ (λ∗E )] Dq (qE∗ , λ∗E ) − m̃q (λ∗E , qE∗ )Dλ (qE∗ , λ∗E )
Now the condition q ∗′ (λ∗E ) > q ′ (λ∗E ) rewrites as
m′ (λ∗E ) − m̃′λ (λ∗E , qE∗ )
Dλ (qE∗ , λ∗E )
>
−Dq (qE∗ , λ∗E )
m̃′q (λ∗E , qE∗ )
or (given that Dq (qE∗ , λ∗E ) < 0 and m̃′q (λ∗E , qE∗ ) > 0, as m̃(λ, q) is increasing in q)
m̃′q (λ∗E , qE∗ )Dλ (qE∗ , λ∗E ) > [m̃λ (λ∗E , qE∗ ) − m′ (λ∗E )] Dq (qE∗ , λ∗E )
which means that the sign of the determinant ∆ of the jacobian at the steady state (λ∗E , qE∗ )
is negative and consequently (λ∗E , qE∗ ) is a saddle node of the joint dynamics of culture and
institutions.
• Many steady states and stability
Assume that q(1) < q ∗ (1) and therefore Λ(1) > 0. When the set Γ includes more
than one point (say N ), one may order the various steady states by increasing order of
their institutional values λ∗i for i ∈ [1, N ] . Moreover λ∗i for i ∈ [1, N ] are the zeros of the
smooth function Λ(λ) in [0, 1] with Λ(0) < 0 < Λ(1). Therefore N is necessarily odd and
N = 2K + 1. Recall that in such a case the steady state associated to λ∗1 = λ∗E is a saddle
and Λ′ (λ∗2k+1 ) > 0 for k ∈ [0, K] odd and Λ′ (λ∗2k ) < 0 for k ∈ [1, K] . Then we have:

∗
- For k ∈ [1, K], the steady states λ∗2k+1 ,q2k+1
are saddle nodes, and the steady state
∗
∗
(λ2k ,q2k ) are locally stable.
Proof : The jacobian matrix at a steady state λ∗i , qi∗ i ∈ [1, N ] is
Ji =

m̃λ (λ∗i ,qi∗ )
−1
m′ (λ∗i )
qi∗ (1 − qi∗ )Dλ (qi∗ , λ∗i )
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qi∗ (1

m̃q (λ∗i ,qi∗ )
m′ (λ∗i )
− qi∗ )Dq (qi∗ , λ∗i )

!

Given that m′ (λ∗i ) > 0, the sign of the determinant ∆i of that jacobian is the same as the
sign of
∆i = [m̃λ (λ∗i , qi∗ ) − m′ (λ∗i )] Dq (qi∗ , λ∗i ) − m̃q (λ∗i , qi∗ )Dλ (qi∗ , λ∗i )
Recalling the fact that at an interior steady state λ∗i :
Λ′ (λ∗i ) = q ∗′ (λ∗i ) − q ′ (λ∗i ) =

Dλ (qi∗ , λ∗i )
m′ (λ∗i ) − m̃′λ (λ∗i , qi∗ )
−∆i
−
=
∗
∗
∗ ∗
∗
′
−Dq (qi , λi )
m̃q (λi , qi )
−Dq (qi , λ∗i )m̃′q (λ∗i , qi∗ )

and because m̃′q > 0, and Dq < 0, it follows that the sign of ∆ (and therefore ∆)at a steady
state λ∗i is the opposite to the sign of Λ′ (λ∗i ).
From this we conclude that:

i) for k ∈ [1, K] as Λ′ (λ∗2k+1 ) = q ∗′ (λ∗2k+1 ) − q ′ λ∗2k+1 > 0, the sign of ∆2k+1 is negative

∗
and the steady state λ∗2k+1 ,q2k+1
is a saddle node.
ii) For k ∈ [1, K] as Λ′ (λ∗2k ) = q ∗′ (λ∗2k ) − q ′ (λ∗2k ) < 0, the sign of ∆2k is positive.
Moreover given that
q ′ (λ∗2k ) =

∗
m′ (λ∗2k ) − m̃′λ (λ∗2k , q2k
)
> q ∗′ (λ∗2k ) > 0
∗
∗
′
m̃q (λ2k , q2k )

∗
∗
and thus m′ (λ∗2k ) − m̃′λ (λ∗2k , q2k
) > 0. Morever Dq (q2k
, λ∗2k ) < 0 and m′ (λ∗2k ) > 0. It follows
that the trace T r (J2k ) of the jacobian J2k is negative as

T r (J2k ) =

∗
m̃′λ (λ∗2k , q2k
)
∗
∗
− 1 + q2k
(1 − q2k
)D (q ∗ , λ∗ ) < 0
∗
′
{z q 2k 2k}
|
m (λ2k )
|
{z
}
−
−

∗
From this it follows that the steady state (λ∗2k ,q2k
) is locally stable for k ∈ [1, K]. QED.

A.7

Proof of Proposition 3

The likelihood of reaching the religious equilibrium is increasing in θ: From Proposition 1,
q(.) is decreasing in θ. From Proposition 2, q ∗ (.) is increasing in θ. Hence, the measure of
parameters for which there is a complementarity between the spread of religious values and
an increase in the political weight of the clerics is larger. This explains why the likelihood
of reaching the religious equilibrium increases.
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The likelihood of reaching the religious equilibrium is decreasing in ϕ: From Proposition
1, q(.) is increasing in ϕ. From Proposition 2, q ∗ (.) is decreasing in ϕ. Hence, the measure
of parameters for which there is a complementarity between the spread of religious values
and an increase in the political weight of the clerics is lower.

A.8

Proof of Lemmas 4 and 5:

In order to prove the two Lemmas, we first derive the tax base E. Since an individual of
type i ∈ {re, s} complies only when
1 − cϵ
1 − τi
>
,
1 + ϕαc
1 + ϕαc
with ϵ =

ϵ0
,
1−αl

(A.51)

the fraction of individuals of type i that comply is:
Z

c

τ /ϵ

dc
τi (1 − αl )
=1−
.
c
ϵ0 c

(A.52)

Summing the taxes that are collected in the two cultural groups, we find that the tax base
is:
τ (1 − qθαc )(1 − αl )
1
{1 −
}.
(A.53)
E=
1 + ϕαc
ϵ0 c
We are now able to solve the equilibrium. As a matter of simplification, we assume
throughout the extension that ψ(αc ) is quadratic with ψ(αc ) = αc2 /2.
The first-order conditions associated with the determination of m(λ), αl (λ, β, q), and
αc (λ) are respectively:



−(1 − λ2 )C ′ (m) + λ2 (αc − F ′ (m)) = 0,


∂E
−αl + (1 − β)τ ∂α
≤ 0, and
l



m − α = 0.

(A.54)

c

The equilibrium is unique, when the marginal cost functions F ′ (.) and C ′ (.) are strictly
increasing convex functions and limm→∞ F ′′ (m) > 1 > F ′′ (0) + C ′′ (0). Typically m(λ) =
C ′′ (0)
αc (λ) = 0 when λ ≤ 2 C ′′ (0)+1−F
′′ (0) , and m(λ) = αc (λ) > 0 is the positive solution of
λ
λ
λ
(1 − )C ′ (m) + F ′ (m) = m,
2
2
2
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(A.55)

′′

C (0)
when λ > 2 C ′′ (0)+1−F
′′ (0) . From this, we deduce that m(λ) and αc (λ) are increasing in λ,
′
′
when F (m) < C (m) and is independent from β, θ, and ϕ. This concludes the proof of
Lemma 4.
Substituting (A.53) in the the second FOC above, we find


(1 − β) τ 2 (1−qθαc (λ)) if (1 − β) τ 2 (1−qθαc (λ)) < α and
l
(1+ϕαc (λ))cϵ0
(1+ϕαc (λ))cϵ0
αl (λ, β, q) =
α otherwise.

(A.56)

l

We deduce that αl (λ, β, q) is decreasing in β, λ q, θ and ϕ. This concludes the proof of
Lemma 5.

A.9

Proof of Proposition 4

As in the related proof of Proposition 1, we first demonstrate that the optimization, problem (15) – rewritten below – admits a unique solution (λt+1 , βt+1 ) ∈ [0, 1]2 :
max (1 −
(λt+1 ,βt+1 )

λt
){Ur (m(λt+1 ), αl (λt+1 , βt+1 , qt )) + Ul (m(λt+1 ), αl (λt+1 , βt+1 , qt ))}
2
λt
+ Uc (m(λt+1 ), αc (λt+1 )),
2

In order to solve this maximization problem, we solve the following related optimization
problem:
max W (m, αl , λt ) = (1 −
m,αl

λt
λt
){Ur (m, αl ) + Ul (m, αl )} + Uc (m).
2
2

(A.57)

The solution, denoted (m̃(λt , qt ), α̃l (λt , qt )),54 maximizes the social welfare when the externalities are internalized, with
1
Uc (m) = mαc (m) − ψ(αc (m)) − F (m) = m2 − F (m)
2
Ur (m, αl ) = βt (τ E(m, αl , qt ) − C(m)) − ραl
α2
Ul (m, αl ) = (1 − βt )(τ E(m, αl , qt ) − C(m)) − l
2

54

making now explicit the dependence on the state variables (λt , qt ).
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and
E(m, αl , qt ) =

1
τ (1 − qt θm)(1 − αl )
{1 −
}.
1 + ϕm
ϵ0 c

(A.58)

The previous optimization problem can be rewritten:
max W (m, αl , λt ) = (1−
m,αl

λt
α2
λt 1
){τ E(m, αl , qt )−C(m)−ραl − l }+ { m2 −F (m)}, (A.59)
2
2
2 2

In this optimization problem, the choices of both the religious provision m and of the effort
of the secular elite αl are made by a ruler who can commit, and hence that internalizes
the externalities detailed in the main text. We find that the solution (m̃(λt , qt ), α̃l (λt , qt ))
of (A.57) solves the following equations:

∂W


= λ2t (m − F ′ (m)) − (1 − λ2t )C ′ (m) + (1 −

∂m



1 τ qθ(1−αl )

} = 0,
+ 1+mϕ
ϵ0 c


and




 ∂W = −α − ρ + τ 2 (1−qt θm) = 0.
l
∂αl
cϵ0 (1+ϕm)

−ϕ
λt
){ (1+mϕ)
2 [1
2

−

τ (1−qθm)(1−αl )
]
ϵ0 c

(A.60)

We deduce the following lemma which characterizes the solution (m̃(λt , qt ), α̃l (λt , qt )) of
(A.57)
Lemma 8 the solution (α̃l (λt , qt ), m̃(λt , qt )) is uniquely determined when C(.), and F (m)
are sufficiently convex (ie W (m, αl , λt ) is concave in m, αl ).
Proof: Specifically, it is a simple matter to see that
∂ 2W
∂m2

=

λt
λt
(1 − F ′′ (m)) − (1 − )C ′′ (m)
2
" 2
#
l)
−[ τ qθ(1−α
]
λt
2ϕ
ϵ0 c
+(1 − )
ϕ
l)
2 (1 + mϕ)2 + (1+mϕ)
[1 − τ (1−qθm)(1−α
]
ϵ c
0

<

λt
λt
λt
2ϕ2
<0
(1 − F ′′ (m)) − (1 − )C ′′ (m) + (1 − )
2
2
2 (1 + mϕ)3

when F ′′ (m) > 1 and C ′′ (m) > 2ϕ2 , while:
∂ 2W
τ 2 qt θ + ϕ
∂ 2W
=
−1
<
0
and
=
−
<0
∂αl2
∂m∂αl
cϵ0 (ϕm + 1)2
88

(A.61)

Therefore the Hessian of W (m, αl , λt ) is given by:

 2
2
∂ 2W ∂ 2W
∂ W
∆ =
−
·
∂m2 ∂αl2
∂m∂αl
"
"
##
τ qθ(1−αl )
2ϕ
′′
{[
]
C
(m)
+
λt ′′
λt
(1+mϕ)2
ϵ0 c
=
(F (m) − 1) + (1 − )
τ (1−qθm)(1−αl )
ϕ
2
2
− (1+mϕ) [1 −
]}
ϵ0 c
τ 4 (qt θ + ϕ)2
−
(cϵ0 )2 (ϕm + 1)4



λt
2ϕ2
λt ′′
′′
(F (m) − 1) + (1 − ) C (m) −
]
>
2
2
(1 + mϕ)3
−

τ 4 (qt θ + ϕ)2
(cϵ0 )2 (ϕm + 1)4
2

2

and ∆ > 0 when F ′′ (m) > 1 + (θ+ϕ)
and C ′′ (m) > 2ϕ2 + (θ+ϕ)
. Therefore W (m, αl , λt ) is
(cϵ )2
(cϵ )2
0

0

2

concave in m, αl when C(.), and F (m) are sufficiently convex. (ie. when F ′′ (m) > 1+ (θ+ϕ)
(cϵ )2
0

and C ′′ (m) > 2ϕ2 +

(θ+ϕ)2
)
(cϵ0 )2

QED.

Now consider (m
e 0 (qt ) , α
el0 (qt )) = arg maxm,αl W (m, αl , 0) and m
e 1 = arg maxm,αl W (m, αl , 1).
m
e 0 respectively the optimal level of religious infrastructure of (A.57)when the secular elite
(and the ruler) have full political power (ie. λ = 0), and when the society is in a religious state (the religious clerics weight is λ = 1). It is reasonable to make the following
assumption:55
Assumption M: m
e 0 (qt ) < m
e 1 for all qt ∈ [0, 1]
namely that the clerics group always wish to have a higher level of religious infrastructures than the secular fraction of society (ruler and secular elite). We have then the
following result:
Lemma 9 Under assumption M , m̃ (λt , qt ) is increasing in λt and qt .and α
el (λt , qt ) is
decreasing in λt and qt .
55

A sufficient condition for assumption M to be satisfied is :
τθ
< C ′ (m
e 1)
ϵ0 c
where m
e 1 is determined by the condition m
e 1 = Φ′ (m
e 1 ).
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Proof: Partial differentiation yields:

∂W
m − F ′ (m) C ′ (m)
=
+
∂m∂λ
2
"2
#
τ (1−qθm)(1−αl )
−ϕ
]
1 (1+mϕ)2 [1 −
ϵ0 c
−
1 τ qθ(1−αl )
2
+ 1+mϕ
ϵ0 c

(A.62)
(A.63)

λt
1
τ θ(1 − αl )
1
∂W
= (1 − )
{
}>0
∂m∂q
2 1 + mϕ
ϵ0 c
(1 + mϕ)
and

∂ 2W
∂ 2W
τ 2 θm
= 0 and
=−
<0
∂αl ∂λ
∂αl ∂q
cϵ0 (1 + ϕm)

(A.64)

Substitution of the FOC (A.60) into (A.62),one obtains when evaluated at the optimal
point m̃, α̃l :


∂W
∂m∂λ


=

1
(m̃ − F ′ (m̃))
(1 − λ2t )

(A.65)

which is positive as long as m̃ (λt , qt ) ≤ m
e 1 . Moreover differentiation of the FOC in (A.60),
provides
dm̃
dα̃l

!
=

∂2W
∂α2l
∂2W
− ∂m∂α
l

1
∆

2

∂ W
− ∂m∂α
l

!

2

∂ W
− ∂m∂λ
dλt −
2

∂2W
∂m2

∂ W
− ∂α
dλt −
l ∂λ



 2
∂2W ∂2W
∂2W
−
dλ
+
− ∂∂αW2 ∂m∂q
+
2
t
1  ∂αl ∂m∂λ
 2l 2
=
2
2
∂ W ∂ W
∂ W
∆
dλt + − ∂∂mW2 ∂α
+
∂m∂αl ∂m∂λ
l ∂q

∂2W
dqt
∂m∂q
2
∂ W
dqt
∂αl ∂q

!

∂2W ∂2W
∂m∂αl ∂αl ∂q



dqt



∂2W ∂2W
∂m∂αl ∂m∂q



dqt



with all derivatives evaluated at m̃, α̃l . Hence using (A.61), (A.62) and (A.64), one gets
∂ m̃
1 ∂ 2W
=
·
∂λt
∆ ∂m∂λ
2

∂ W
the sign of which is the same as the sign of ∂m∂λ
. Now under assumption M, one can see
from (A.65) that m̃ (λt , qt ) is increasing in λt as long as m̃ (λt , qt ) < m
e 1 . Note first that
m̃ (1, qt ) = m
e 1 . Suppose then that there exists a value λ < 1 such that m̃ (λ, qt ) = m
e 1.
From (A.60), and noting that

W (m, αl , λ) = λW (m, αl , 1) + (1 − λ)W (m, αl , 0)
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at this point m̃ (λ, qt ) , α
el (λ, qt ) , one should have


∂W
∂m


=λ
m̃1 ,α̃1
l

∂W (m, αl , 0)
∂W (m, αl , 1)
+ (1 − λ)
=0
∂m
∂m

But m̃ (λ, qt ) = m
e 1 = arg maxm,αl W (m, αl , 1) , implies that





∂W (m,αl ,1)
= 0 at such
∂m
l ,0)
have ∂W (m,α
= 0, which
∂m

point. Hence to satisfy the previous equation, we should also
in turn implies that m̃ (λ, qt ) = m
e 0 (qt ), a contradiction with assumption M . From this we
conclude that m̃ (λ, qt ) < m
e 1 for all λ < 1 or m̃ (λ, qt ) > m
e 1 for all λ < 1. The only case
consistent with assumption M is obviously that m̃ (λ, qt ) < m
e 1 for all λ < 1. From this we
∂2W
conclude that under assumption M, ∂m∂λ
evaluated at m̃ (λ, qt ) , α
el (λ, qt ) is positive and
∂ m̃
therefore ∂λt > 0 (ie. religious infrastructures m̃ (λt , qt ) is increasing in the clerics’ political
weight λt ).
Similarly, using (A.61), (A.62) and (A.64), we have:
∂ α̃l
1
∂ 2W ∂ 2W
=
·
∂λt
∆ ∂m∂αl ∂m∂λ
←−−−→
−

Hence ∂∂λα̃tl < 0 under assumption M (ie. the tax enforcement effort of the secular elite
α
el (λt , qt ) is decreasing in the clerics’ weight λt ).
Finally, substituting (A.61), (A.62) and (A.64),we obtain




1  ∂ 2W
∂ 2W
∂ 2W 
∂ m̃
>0
= 
+
·
∂qt
∆  ∂m∂q ∂m∂αl ∂αl ∂q 
←−−→ ←−−−→ ←−−→
−

+

−





∂ α̃l
1 
∂ 2W ∂ 2W
∂ 2W
∂ 2W 

<0
= −
·
+
·

2
∂qt
∆ ←−∂m
∂α
∂m∂α
l ∂q
l ∂m∂q
−−→ ←−−→ ←−−−→ ←−−→
+
−

+

QED.
In order to simplify the problem, we make the following assumption on the higher bound
αl :
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Assumption A: αl <

1 − θm(1)
τ2
1 + ϕm(1)
ϵ0 c

Before going further with the proof, we establish this intermediary result:
Lemma 10 Under Assumption A, αl (λ, β = 0) = αl for any (λ, q) ∈ [0, 1]2 .
Proof: In order to prove Lemma 10, we need to write the first-order derivative of the
utility of the secular elites with respect to αl is:
∂Ul
τ 2 (1 − qθm)
= −αl + (1 − β)
.
∂αl
(1 + ϕm)ϵ0 c

(A.66)

l
Hence, when β = 0, under Assumption A, ∂U
> 0 for any αl ∈ [0, αl ] and for any
∂αl
2
(λ, q) ∈ [0, 1] , so αl (λ, β = 0, q) = αl for any (λ, q) ∈ [0, 1]2 . This concludes the proof of
the Lemma. QED.
Since (α̃l (λt , qt ), m̃(λt , qt )) maximizes the social welfare when the externalities are internalized, (λt+1 , βt+1 ) solves the optimization problem (15) when:


m̃(λ , q ) = m(λ
t

t+1 ),

t

α̃ (λ , q ) = α (λ
l

t

t

l

and

(A.67)

t+1 , βt+1 , qt )

Indeed, when the clerics and the ruler have power λt+1 and βt+1 , institutions are designed
for t+1 so as to induce a choice m(λt+1 ) and αl (λt+1 , βt+1 , qt ) in that period that maximizes
the social welfare under the institutional framework of period t. It remains to be proven
that the solution (λt+1 , βt+1 ) of the system (A.67) is unique. Consider the following system
with two unknown variables x and y:

m̃(λ , q ) = m(x), and
t t
α̃ (λ , q ) = α (x, y, q ),
l

t

t

l

(A.68)

t

Consider first the case where an interior solution exists. Since the function m(.) is increasing
in its argument, from Lemma 4, there exists a unique value x(λt , qt ) ∈ [0, 1] such that
m̃(λt , qt ) = m(x). Substituting x(λt , qt ) in the second equation, we find:
α̃l (λt , qt ) = αl (x(λt , qt ), y, qt ),
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(A.69)

By definition, α̃l (λt , qt ) ∈ [0, αl ]. Furthermore, as αl (x(λt , qt ), y, qt ) is decreasing in
y from Lemma 5, under Assumption A, αl (x(λt , qt ), 1, qt ) = 0 ≤ αl (x(λt , qt ), y, qt ) ≤
αl (x(λt , qt ), 0, qt ) = αl . Hence, applying the theorem of intermediate values, there exists
a single vector (x(λt , qt ), y(λt , qt )) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that (A.67) holds. We have demonstrated
that the system (A.67) admits a unique interior solution, when this solution exists.
An interior solution does not always exists, as it can be that m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt+1 )
or m̃(λt , qt ) < m(λt+1 ) for any λt+1 ∈ [0, 1]. In these two cases, there is a single solution
(λt+1 , βt+1 ) to the optimization problem (15), which is the unique vector such that (m(λt+1 ),
αl (λt+1 , βt+1 , qt )) maximizes (A.57). Indeed, when m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt+1 ), then λt+1 = 1, and
βt+1 solves
α̃l (λt , qt ) = αl (1, βt+1 , qt )
(A.70)
for βt+1 ∈ [0, 1]. As αl (1, βt+1 , qt ) is decreasing in βt+1 from Lemma 5, under Assumption ??, αl (1, 1, qt ) = 0 ≤ αl (1, βt+1 , qt ) ≤ αl (1, 0, qt ) = αl . Applying the theorem of
intermediate values, there exists a single βt+1 ∈ [0, 1] such that α̃l (λt , qt ) = αl (1, βt+1 , qt )
The reasoning is similar when m̃(λt , qt ) < m(λt+1 ) for any λt+1 ∈ [0, 1]: λt+1 = 0 and
there is a unique solution βt+1 ∈ [0, 1] to the equation α̃l (λt , qt ) = αl (0, βt+1 , qt ). From this
we conclude that the optimization problem (15) admits a unique solution (λt+1 , βt+1 ).
We are now going to demonstrate that there exists a threshold q d (λt ) such that if
qt > q d (λt ), then λt+1 > λt . Otherwise, λt+1 ≤ λt . In order to demonstrate this claim, we
will show the following intermediary result:
Lemma 11 λt+1 > λt if and only if m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt ).
Proof: Indeed, m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt ) means that in (A.57), the ruler would want to
commit to a provision level m̃(λt , qt ) strictly above what is provided in equilibrium. Since
m(.) is increasing in λ (Lemma 4), we deduce that when the political weight λt+1 , that
decentralizes m̃(λt , qt ) is such that m̃(λt , qt ) = m(λt+1 ), one has that λt+1 > λt . A similar
reasoning can be applied for the corners when λt+1 = 1 when m̃(λt , qt ) > m(1) or λt+1 = 0
when m̃(λt , qt ) < m(0). QED.
Lemma 12 m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt ) if and only if q > q d (λt ), with qd (λt ) is defined as the
threshold the value of q ∈ [0, 1] such that


 
ϕ
1
1
q = max min {
−
}, 1 , 0 .
θ τ (1 − α̃l (λt , q)) ϵ0 c
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(A.71)

Proof: Given that m̃(λt , qt ) is increasing in qt , the condition m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt ) is
equivalent to qt > q d (λt ) ∈ [0, 1] with q d (λt ) defined such
m̃(λt , q d (λt )) = m(λt ) when m̃(λt , 0) ≤ m(λt ) ≤ m̃(λt , 1)
q d (λt ) = 0 when m̃(λt , 0) > m(λt )
q d (λt ) = 1 when m̃(λt , 1) < m(λt )
More specifically, the first-order condition associated with the determination of m(λ) is:
λ
λ
(m − F ′ (m)) − (1 − )C ′ (m) = 0.
2
2

(A.72)

The first-order condition for the determination of m̃(λ, q) writes as
λ
λ
λ
(m − F ′ (m)) − (1 − )C ′ (m) + (1 − )
2
2
2

"

−ϕ
[1
(1+mϕ)2

τ (1−qθm)(1−α̃l (λ,q))
]
ϵ0 c
τ
qθ(1−
α̃
(λ,q))
1
l
+ 1+mϕ
ϵ0 c

−

#
= 0. (A.73)

Given the two FOCs above, we deduce that m̃(λt , qt ) > m(λt ) if and only if:
(1 −

λt
−ϕ
τ (1 − qt θm)(1 − α̃l (λt , qt ))
1
τ qt θ(1 − α̃l (λt , qt ))
){
[1
−
]
+
} > 0,
2 (1 + mϕ)2
ϵ0 c
1 + mϕ
ϵ0 c
(A.74)

or

ϕ[1 −

τ qt θ(1 − α̃l (λt , qt ))
τ (1 − qt θm)(1 − α̃l (λt , qt ))
] < (1 + mϕ)
ϵ0 c
ϵ0 c


τ (1 − α̃l (λt , qt ))
τ qt θ(1 − α̃l (λt , qt ))
ϕ 1−
<
ϵ0 c
ϵ0 c


ϕ
ϵ0 c
− 1 < qt
θ τ (1 − α̃l (λt , qt ))

which rewrites
qt >

ϕ
ϵ0 c
{
− 1}.
θ τ (1 − α̃l (λt , qt ))

Denote Σ (λ, q) the function
Σ (λ, q) = q −

ϕ
ϵ0 c
{
− 1}
θ τ (1 − α̃l (λ, q))
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(A.75)

Given that α̃l (λ, q) is a decreasing function of q, Σ (λ, q) is an increasing function of q. Now
condition (A.75)is equivalent to qt > qd (λt ) with
ϕ
ϵ0 c
qd (λt ) = 0 when Σ (λt , 0) = − {
− 1} > 0
θ τ (1 − α̃l (λt , 0))
ϕ
ϵ0 c
qd (λt ) = 1 when Σ (λt , 1) = 1 − {
− 1} < 0
θ τ (1 − α̃l (λt , 1)
qd (λt ) = q ∈ (0, 1) such that Σ (λt , q) = 0 otherwise
Compactly, qd (λt ) is defined as the threshold the value of q ∈ [0, 1] such that
 
ϵ0 c
ϕ
− 1}, 1 , 0 .
q = max min {
θ τ (1 − α̃l (λt , q))




(A.76)

and m̃(λt ) > m(λt ) if and only if q > q d (λt ). We deduce that q d (λt ) is increasing in ϕ and
decreasing in θ and λt . Combining the results established in Lemma 11 and Lemma 12,
we get that λt+1 > λt if and only if q > q d (λt ). QED.
Finally, we demonstrate that there exists a threshold q̃d (λt , βt ) such that if qt >
q̃d (λt , βt ), then βt+1 > βt . Otherwise, βt+1 ≤ βt . In order to demonstrate this claim,
we proceed in two steps. First, we show the following result:
Lemma 13 βt+1 > βt if and only if α̃l (λt , βt ) < αl (λt+1 , βt ), with

λt+1




λ s.t m(λ) = m̃(λt )


= 1



0

if m̃(λt ) ∈ (m(0), m(1))
if m̃(λt ) > m(1)

(A.77)

if m̃(λt ) < m(0).

Proof: Indeed, α̃l (λt , qt ) < αl (λt+1 , βt , qt ) means that – given that the clerics have an
optimal weight λt+1 – if the ruler could, he would wish the secular elite to provide a lower
enforcement effort. Since αl (λt+1 , qt , .) is a decreasing function of βt , the ruler increases his
own political weight βt , so that the secular elite provides less effort: βt+1 > βt . QED.

Lemma 14 There exists a threshold q̃d (λt , βt ) ∈ [0, 1] such that α̃l (λt , qt ) < αl (λt+1 , βt , qt )
if and only if q > q̃d (λt , βt ), with q̃d (λt , 1) = 1 and λt+1 given in (A.77).
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Proof: The first-order condition associated with the determination of α̃l (λt , qt ) is:
− α̃l (λt , qt ) − ρ +

τ 2 (1 − qt θαc ( m̃(λt , qt )))
=0
cϵ0 (1 + ϕαc ( m̃(λt , qt ))

(A.78)

Given that m̃(λt , qt ) = m(λt+1 ), this rewrites as
− α̃l (λt , qt ) − ρ +

τ 2 (1 − qt θαc (m(λt+1 ))
=0
cϵ0 (1 + ϕαc (m(λt+1 ))

(A.79)

The first-order condition associated with the determination of αl (λt+1 , βt , qt ) is:
− αl (λt+1 , βt , qt ) + (1 − βt )

τ 2 (1 − qt θαc (m(λt+1 ))
=0
cϵ0 (1 + ϕαc (m(λt+1 ))

(A.80)

Hence, the inequality α̃l (λt , qt ) < αl (λt+1 , βt , qt ) is verified when
ρ > βt

τ 2 (1 − qt θαc (m̃(λt , qt ))
,
cϵ0 (1 + ϕαc (m̃(λt , qt ))

(A.81)

Now the RHS of (A.81) is decreasing in qt as m̃(λt , qt ) is an increasing function of qt so
there exists a unique threshold q̃d (λt , βt ) such that if q > q̃d (λt , βt ), then (A.81) is satisfied.
Otherwise, it is not satisfied. Moreover given that the RHS of (A.81) is decreasing in λt
(as m̃(λt , qt ) and αc (m̃(λt , qt ) are increasing in λt ), and increasing in βt , it follows that the
threshold q̃d (λt , βt ) is decreasing in λt and increasing in βt . QED.
Combining the results established in Lemmas 12 and 14, we have demonstrated that
βt+1 > βt if and only if q > q̃d (λt , βt ).
Summarizing, we have demonstrated the followings:
• The optimization problem (15) admits a unique solution (λt+1 , βt+1 ) ∈ [0, 1]2 .
• there exists a threshold q̃d (λt , βt ) such that if q > q̃d (λt , βt ) then βt+1 > βt . Otherwise,
βt+1 ≤ βt .
• There exists a threshold q d (λt ) such that if qt > q d (λt ), then λt+1 > λt . Otherwise,
λt+1 ≤ λt .
• q̃d (λt , βt ) is decreasing in λt and increasing in βt . and q d (λt ) is decreasing in λt .
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Finally, q̃d (λt , 1) = 1 because in equilibrium, the secular elite provides no effort,
αl (λt , 0, qt ) = 0 and have zero utility. Hence, an epsilon increase in their political weight
1 − βt will increase the social welfare by increasing both the utility of the ruler, and of the
secular elite. This concludes the proof of Proposition 4. QED.

A.10

Proof of Proposition 5

As in the proof of Proposition 2, we first deduce from the maximization program (9) that
d∗Re = DRe ((1 − qt )∆VRe , m) with DRe (0, m) = 0, and DRe (·, ·) an increasing function of
both arguments (1 − qt )∆VRe and m. Also from (10) d∗S = DS (qt ∆VS ) is an increasing
function of qt ∆VS .
Parents do not know the realization of their children’s capacity c to escape taxation
when cultural transmission occurs. Consequently, the paternalistic motives have to be
amended to involve expectations of the induced utilities with respect such capacity c.
More precisely we have:

V

ReRe (λ, β, q)

V

=

Re S (λ, β, q) =

R τ /ϵ (1−cϵ) dc
(1−τRe ) R c
dc
+ 0 Re 1+ϕα
1+ϕαc (λ) τRe /ϵ c
c (λ) c
R τ /ϵ (1−cϵ) dc
(1−τRe ) R c dc
+ 0 1+ϕαc (λ) c ,
(1+ϕαc (λ)) τ /ϵ c

(A.82)

with ϵ = ϵ0 /(1 − αl (λ, β, q)). Hence,
(τ θαc (λ))2 (1 − αl (λ, q, β))
.
∆VRe (λ, β, q) =
2cϵ0 (1 + ϕαc (λ))

(A.83)

Similarly, we find that
∆VS (λ, β, q) = ∆VRe (λ, β, q) = ∆V (λ, β, q) =

(τ θαc (λ))2 (1 − αl (λ, β, q))
.
2cϵ0 (1 + ϕαc (λ))

(A.84)

Again the result that ∆Vs (λ, β, q) = ∆Vre (λ, β, q) follows from the quadratic specification
of the expected payoff functions. Note as well that because αl (λ, β, q) depends on q (ie. is
a decreasing function in q), ∆V (λ, β, q) also depends on q and is an increasing function of
q
Now, the cultural dynamics write as
qt+1 − qt = qt (1 − qt )D(λt , βt , qt ).
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(A.85)

with
D(λt , βt , qt ) = d∗Re − d∗S = DRe [(1 − qt )∆V (λt , βt , qt ), m(λt )] − DS [qt ∆V (λt , βt , qt )]
can be interpreted as the relative ”cultural fitness” of the religious trait in the population.
Again simple inspection shows
D(λt , βt , 0) = DRe [∆V (λt , βt , 0), m(λt )] > 0
and
D(λt , βt , 1) = −DS [∆V (λt , βt , 1)] < 0
From this it follows that there exists a threshold qd∗ (λt , βt ) ∈ (0, 1) such that
D(λt , βt , qd∗ (λt , βt )) = 0

(A.86)

Compared to the benchmark model, D(λt , βt , qt ) may not be always decreasing function
in qt , as ∆V (λt , βt , qt ) is increasing in qt and the uniqueness of the threshold qd∗ (λt , βt ) is
not necessarily ensured. When however (1 − q)∆V (λ, β, q) is a decreasing function of q,56
simple inspection shows that D(λt , βt , qt ) is a decreasing function of qt and that qt+1 < qt
if and only if qt > qd∗ (λt , βt ), as stated in proposition 5.
In such a case, defining again the sensitivity of parents’ socialization to paternalistic
motives by the following elasticities:
ϵRe =

∂DRe (x, y)
x
∂DS
z
·
and ϵS =
·
∂x
DRe
∂z DRe

evaluated respectively at x = (1 − q)∆V (λ, β, q) and y = m(λ), and z = q∆V (λ, β, q), we
obtain
∆V ′ (λ ,β )

Re
[ϵRe − ϵS ] d∗ (λt , βt ) · ∆Vλ(λtt,βtt) + ∂D
· m′ (λt )
∂qd∗ (λt , βt )
∂m
=
∂λ
− ∂D
(λt , βt , qd∗ (λt , βt ))
∂q

(A.87)

with d∗ (λt , βt ) = d∗Re ((λt , βt , qd∗ (λt , βt )) = d∗S ((λt , βt , qd∗ (λt , βt )), the equilibrium commun
socialization rate at the threshold qd∗ (λt , βt ). Again the numerator is composed of two terms
reflecting the two channels through which the institutional environment λt affects cultural
56

This is ensured when 1 >

τ2
cϵ0

max





θ
ϕ, 1
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∆V ′ (λ ,β )

transmission. The first term K(λt ) = [ϵRe − ϵS ] d∗ (λt , βt ) · ∆Vλ(λtt,βtt) is the paternalistic
motive channel. As ∆Vλ′ (λt , βt ) > 0, the sign of K(λt ) depends on the relative sensitivity
of parents’ socialization to paternalistic motives. It is positive when ϵRe > ϵS , namely when
the socialization rate of religious parents d∗Re is more sensitive to paternalistic motives than
Re
· m′ (λt ) reflects the positive
the one of secular parents d∗S . The second positive term ∂D
∂m
effect of promoting religious infrastructures as complementary inputs in the transmission
process of the religious trait.
As in the benchmark model, it follows again that when religious parents’ socialization
efforts are more sensitive to paternalistic motives than secular parents (ie. ϵRe > ϵS ) , and
(or) when religious infrastructures are strong enough complementary inputs to socialization
to the religious trait, then the numerator of (A.87) is positive and qd∗ (λt , βt ) is increasing
in λt .
• Example with constant elasticity socialization cost functions
Consider the following socialization cost functions:

h (d) = d1+ηre ·
Re
1+ηre
h (d) = d1+ηs ,
s

1
χ(m)

and

(A.88)

1+ηs

with ηs ≥ ηre > 0 and χ′ (m) > 0. The optimal socialization efforts are such that:

1
1
d∗ (q , λ ) = ((1 − q )∆V (λ , β , q )) ηre
· [χ (λt )] ηre
t
t
t
t
t t
Re
d∗ (q , λ ) = (q ∆V (λ , β , q )) η1s .
S

t

t

t

t

t

(A.89)

t

and in this constant elasticity specification ϵRe − ϵS =
described as:
1

1
ηre

− η1s ≥ 0. Cultural dynamics are

1

1

qt+1 − qt = qt (1 − qt ){((1 − qt )∆V (λt , βt , qt )) ηre · [χ (λt )] ηre − (qt ∆V (λt , βt , qt )) ηs }, (A.90)
which admits two unstable steady states q = 0 and q = 1, and in general a unique interior
attractor, which we denote qd∗ (λt , βt ) such that:
1

qd∗ (λt , βt ) ηs
1

(1 − qd∗ (λt , βt )) ηre

=[

re
1
(τ θαc (λt ))2 (1 − αl (λt , βt , qd∗ (λt , βt )) ηηS −η
] S ηre · [χ (λt )] ηre
2cϵ0 (1 + ϕαc (λt ))
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(A.91)

From the last equation, and given that ηS > ηre , we deduce that qd∗ (λt , βt ) is increasing
in θ, λt and βt and decreasing in ϕ. This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.
• Joint dynamics with qd∗ (λt , βt ) independent from βt .
Consider the case where the socialization cost functions of religious and secular parents
are given by the following form
hRe (d, m) =

d1+η 1
d1+η
, hs (d) =
with η > 0
1 + η χ(m)
1+η

from (A.91), it is immediate that the threshold qd∗ (λt , βt ) is given by:
qd∗ (λt , βt ) = qd∗ (λt ) =

[χ (λt )]
1 + [χ (λt )]

and is therefore independent from βt . In such a case the dynamics of λt and qt are such
that: λt+1 > λt if and only if qt > q d (λt ), and qt+1 > qt if and only if qt < qd∗ (λt ) They are
then decoupled from the dynamics of βt and follow the same pattern as in the benchmark
model. Consequently, depending on the initial conditions (λ0 , q0 ), (λt , qt ) converge towards
a religious regime (1, qd∗ (1)) or a secular regime (0, qd∗ (0)) . Associated to these dynamics,
the dynamics of political centralization then converges towards strong state centralization
with β1∗ = βed (1, qd∗ (1)), or weak state centralization β0∗ = βed (0, qd∗ (0)) < β1∗ . QED.
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